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TRADEMARK USE AND THE
PROBLEM OF SOURCE'
Mark P. McKenna*
This Article mediates a scholarly debate regarding the existence
and desirability of a "trademark use" doctrine. It argues that trade-
mark use is a predicate of liability under the Lanham Act, but those
who advocate treating trademark use as a threshold question put
much more weight on that concept than it can bear. Courts cannot
consistently apply trademark use as a distinct element of the plaintiffs
prima facie case because trademark use can be determined only from
the perspective of consumers. Specifically, courts can determine
whether a defendant has made trademark use of a plaintiffs mark on-
ly by asking whether consumers are likely to view the defendant's use
as one that indicates the source of the defendant's products or servic-
es. Because such an inquiry is, by its nature, highly context-sensitive,
trademark use is not a concept capable of serving the limiting func-
tion advocates hope. The trademark use debate, however, reveals a
fundamental problem in modern trademark law and theory. Con-
sumer understanding, and particularly consumer understanding of
"source," defines virtually all of modern trademark law's boundaries.
But these boundaries are never fixed because consumer understand-
ing is inherently unstable, particularly with respect to an ill-defined
term like "source. "
I. INTRODUCTION
"Trademark use" is all the rage. Several scholars recently have put
their faith in the trademark use doctrine as a tool for defining the boun-
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daries of trademark law, and particularly as an antidote to the "new and
unprecedented form[s] of trademark infringement claim[s]" trademark
owners have asserted against information intermediaries and creators of
expressive works.' These scholars argue that only certain types of uses of
another's mark-trademark uses-can constitute infringement, and that
courts can predictably limit the scope of trademark rights by emphasizing
trademark use as an essential element of infringement.2 Even better,
these scholars suggest, courts can determine early in litigation whether a
particular use is trademark use, and therefore can resolve at least some
cases without getting bogged down in the unpredictable, context-
dependent likelihood of confusion analysis.3 On this account, not only
does the trademark use doctrine help resolve particularly hard cases, it
also limits the amount of feedback in trademark law by giving potential
defendants greater certainty about the legality of their uses.4
The trademark use doctrine is seductive because it promises pre-
dictable limits on the scope of trademark rights, and limits of any kind
have proven remarkably elusive in modern trademark law. Moreover,
1. See Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Grounding Trademark Law Through Trademark
Use, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1669, 1674 (2007) (arguing that "the trademark use doctrine, properly applied,
serves as a limited tool for identifying classes of behavior that cannot constitute infringement"); see
also Margreth Barrett, Internet Trademark Suits and the Demise of "Trademark Use," 39 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 371, 395-96 (2006) ("In the course of evaluating infringement and dilution claims in this new
and unique setting [on the Internet], courts have too often lost sight of the important limiting function
the trademark use requirement should play."); Eric Goldman, Deregulating Relevancy in Internet
Trademark Law, 54 EMORY L.J. 507, 593-94 (2005) (finding a trademark use requirement in the Lan-
ham Act and arguing for rigorous application of the doctrine to immunize search providers from liabil-
ity); Uli Widmaier, Use, Liability, and the Structure of Trademark Law, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 603, 708
(2004) (arguing that "the misinterpretation of the trademark use requirement-or more accurately,
the flat-out disregard of that requirement-has given rise to a veritable cottage industry among the
courts, an entire line of cases that are wrongly decided, that impose trademark infringement liability
where none exists").
2. Barrett, supra note 1, at 395-96; Dogan & Lemley, supra note 1, at 1670-72. This is not pure-
ly an academic argument; defendants increasingly are making trademark use arguments to courts.
Google articulated this position in its brief to the Second Circuit in Rescuecom Corp. v. Google, Inc.,
arguing that
bootstrapping a finding of use by alleging other elements of a trademark claim, such as likelihood
of confusion, puts the cart before the horse. Just as a plaintiff in a negligence case cannot claim
that the allegation that she fell and broke her arm shows that the defendant breached the appli-
cable duty of care, Rescuecom cannot claim that the allegation of a likelihood of confusion shows
that Google engaged in trademark use.
Brief for Defendant-Appellee at 12-13, Rescuecom Corp. v. Google, Inc., No. 06-4881-cv (2d Cir. Feb.
12, 2007), available at http://claranet.scu.edu/eres/coursepage.aspx?cid=1754&page=docs# [hereinafter
Google Brief] (follow "Google's Appellee Brief in Rescuecom v. Google" hyperlink).
3. Dogan & Lemley, supra note 1, at 1695-96.
4. Consumer expectations largely define trademark rights, yet those expectations are influ-
enced by consumers' understanding (or misunderstanding) of the law. See, e.g., Dogan & Lemley, su-
pra note 1, at 1696 (arguing that, because litigation is costly and uncertain, many people who have the
right to make a particular use will not, which "in turn may actually affect consumer perceptions of
whether such uses are permissible at all"); James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intel-
lectual Property Law, 116 YALE L.J. 882, 907 (2007); Mark P. McKenna, The Normative Foundations
of Trademark Law, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1839, 1916 (2007) (arguing that "once courts and Con-
gress began to expand trademark law and committed it to consumer understanding, expansion became
self-reinforcing-broader protection begets consumer expectations of greater control, which begets
even broader protection").
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the language of trademark use seems familiar to trademark scholars, as
trademark law has long limited liability to certain types of uses of anoth-
er's mark that are colloquially referred to as "trademark uses." The lim-
its trademark use advocates propose therefore appear to follow naturally
from trademark law's own policies rather than external forces like the
First Amendment. Indeed the doctrine is sufficiently attractive to enjoy
relatively widespread support among intellectual property scholars.5
Unfortunately, while they advance the trademark use doctrine as a
tool for creating predictability, none of the doctrine's advocates is able to
articulate clear rules by which courts can distinguish trademark uses from
non-trademark uses. Dogan and Lemley, for example, do not specifically
define trademark use but focus on uses "to promote [a party's] own
products or services" or "to indicate the source or sponsorship of [the
party's] products or services."6 This type of definition is the best we can
hope for because the only trademark use limitation in the Lanham Act is
a functional one: the infringement provisions implicitly limit liability to
uses by the defendant that indicate the source of its products or services.
But such a functional trademark use limitation cannot predictably limit
liability because it cannot be determined without resort to consumer un-
derstanding.7 Specifically, under modern trademark law, courts can find
that a defendant has made trademark use of a plaintiff's mark only if the
5. In addition to the academic articles noted above, law professors have authored and signed
amicus briefs arguing for recognition of trademark use as a threshold determination and have testified
before Congress to stress the importance of the doctrine. See Brief of Amici Curiae Intellectual Prop-
erty Law Faculty in Support of Affirmance, Rescuecom Corp. v. Google, Inc., No. 06-4881-cv (2d Cir.
Feb. 22, 2007), available at http:l/claranet.scu.edulereslcoursepage.aspx?cid=1754&page=docs# (follow
"Rescuecom v. Google Law Professors Amicus Brief" hyperlink); Trademark Dilution Revision Act of
2005: Hearing on H.R. 683 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of
the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 18-21 (2005) (statement of Mark A. Lemley, William H.
Neukom Professor of Law, Stanford Law School). This enthusiasm is not universal, however. Res-
ponding particularly to Dogan and Lemley, Graeme Dinwoodie and Mark Janis have rejected the
trademark use doctrine both descriptively and prescriptively. Graeme Dinwoodie & Mark Janis, Con-
fusion over Use: Contextualism in Trademark Law, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1597 (2007). I address many of
Dinwoodie and Janis's arguments throughout this Article.
6. Dogan & Lemley, supra note 1, at 1682. Margreth Barrett does advocate for the formal un-
derstanding, at least to some extent. Barrett, supra note 1, at 379-87.
7. Ironically, the very cases that have animated most scholars' advocacy of a trademark use
doctrine-the keyword advertising cases-have come to strikingly different conclusions as to whether
the trademark use doctrine exists and whether use of another's mark in keyword advertising consti-
tutes trademark use in commerce. Compare Buying for the Home, LLC v. Humble Abode, LLC. 459
F. Supp. 2d 310, 323 (D.N.J. 2006) (holding keyword use by advertisers constitutes trademark use in
commerce), and Edina Realty, Inc. v. TheMLSonline.com, No. Civ. 04-4371JRTFLN, 2006 WL
737064, at *3 (D. Minn. Mar. 20, 2006) (same), with Merck & Co. v. Mediplan Health Consulting, Inc.,
425 F. Supp. 2d 402, 416 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (holding keyword use is not trademark use in commerce);
compare Washingtonpost.Newsweek Interactive Co. v. Gator Corp., No. Civ. A. 02-909-A, 2002 WL
31356645, at *1 (E.D. Va. July 16, 2002) (holding use of keywords to trigger adware constitutes trade-
mark use in commerce), with 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 414 F.3d 400,412 (2d Cir. 2005)
(holding use of keywords to trigger adware is not trademark use in commerce), Wells Fargo & Co. v.
WhenU.com, Inc., 293 F. Supp. 2d 734, 764 (E.D. Mich. 2003) (same), and U-Haul Int'l, Inc. v. Whe-
nU.com, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 2d 723,729 (same).
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evidence suggests consumers are likely to view the defendant's use as
one that indicates the source of the defendant's products or services.
8
Indeed, precisely because trademark use is not separable from con-
sumer understanding, proponents cannot articulate the doctrine without
lapsing into claims about likelihood of confusion. In the context of
product configuration trade dress, for example, Dogan and Lemley
would determine whether a particular use was a trademark use solely by
asking whether the defendant's use was likely to cause confusion. "If a
party adopts its competitor's protected, non-functional product configu-
ration in a way that confuses potential customers over source, sponsor-
ship, or affiliation, it is engaged in trademark use of that trade dress."9
So understood, trademark use is simply likelihood of confusion by
another name, and it suffers from all the same problems trademark use
advocates claim the doctrine solves.
Despite the trademark use doctrine's inability to serve as a limiting
mechanism, the trademark use debate is an important one because it ex-
poses a fundamental shortcoming of modern trademark law and theory.
Almost every significant limitation in trademark law-from the existence
of protectable rights to the scope of those rights and the availability of
defenses-depends on consumer understanding. In itself this renders
trademark law inherently unstable. Consumer beliefs are highly suggest-
ible and based in part on understanding (or misunderstanding) of the
law.1" This instability is particularly pronounced in trademark law, how-
ever, because the relevant consumer beliefs are those regarding
"source," an extraordinarily vague concept capable of encompassing al-
most any imaginable relationship between parties.
To take a seemingly extreme example, imagine consumers came to
believe that no one could legally use the "Nike" mark in any way without
Nike's permission-perhaps because Nike tells them as much." Operat-
8. "Source" is defined broadly here to include not only the actual physical source of a product
or service, but those who sponsor or are affiliated with the product or service.
9. Dogan & Lemley, supra note 1, at 1699.
10. See generally Gibson, supra note 4.
11. See NikeStore Customer Service, Privacy/Security, http://www.nike.com/renov/nikestore/us/
vl/us/enlinfo/privacy.jsp?item=terms (last visited Feb. 28, 2009) ("All trademarks, service marks and
trade names (e.g., the NIKE name, the Swoosh design and the Basketball Player Silhouette (Jump-
man) design) are trademarks or registered trademarks of NIKE. Unless otherwise restricted, you may
use the content of the website only for your own non-commercial use to place an order or to purchase
NIKE products. Any other use is prohibited unless agreed to by NIKE in writing."). These overbroad
statements are extremely common. See, e.g., Coca-Cola.com Terms of Use, http://www.coca-cola.com/
webstore/enUS/templatel/terms of use en US.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2009) ("Any Content that
is a trademark, logo or service mark is also a registered and unregistered trademark of The Coca-Cola
Company or others. Your use of any Content, except as provided in these Terms of Use, without the
written permission of the Content owner is strictly prohibited. You are also advised that The Coca-
Cola Company will aggressively enforce its intellectual property rights to the fullest extent of the law,
including the seeking of criminal prosecution."). Google is somewhat more subtle, though one could
plausibly read its terms of service as to prohibit use of Google's trademarks. See Google Terms of
Service, http://www.google.com/accounts/TOS?loc=US (last visited Feb. 28, 2009) ("Unless you have
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ing under such a belief, consumers who encountered an article in the
New York Times entitled "Nike Releases New Cross-Training Line"
might well expect that the New York Times had licensed use of the Nike
mark.12 If the newspaper did not license use of the Nike mark, these con-
sumers would be confused about Nike's sponsorship of or affiliation with
the New York Times, 3 and the paper's use would therefore infringe
Nike's rights.
Uses in newspaper headlines generally have not been thought to in-
fringe trademark rights, not because of a trademark use doctrine, but on-
ly because courts have presumed that consumers do not regard such uses
as source indicative. 4 Whether such a presumption historically has been
justifiable, it becomes more questionable every day as consumers be-
come more aware of marketing practices, such as product placement,
that blur the line between advertising and content. Yet the presumption
that consumers do not perceive uses in headlines as source indicative is
the only reason, under modern trademark principles, that the New York
Times would evade liability for its hypothetical use. If and when con-
sumers begin expecting that newspapers license use of trademarks, there
will be no principled trademark reason to refuse to expand liability ac-
cordingly. 5
The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows. First, because
trademark use advocates and critics alike claim for their view better his-
torical footing, I describe in Part 11 the role of "use" in traditional trade-
mark law. I argue that, while most traditional use precedent is anachro-
nistic, courts did limit liability to uses of a mark to indicate the source of
one's goods or services. In this sense, courts did require trademark use
as a condition of liability. This functional trademark use limitation was
meaningful because courts in the traditional era conceived of "source"
literally-only uses that caused confusion regarding the actual, historical
source of a good were actionable.
I argue in Part III that the modern Lanham Act continues implicitly
to condition liability on "trademark use" in this functional sense, as only
source-designating uses can cause relevant confusion. Unfortunately, as
I argue in Part IV, one can determine whether a particular use indicates
agreed otherwise in writing with Google, nothing in the Terms gives you a right to use any of Google's
trade names, trade marks, service marks, logos, domain names, and other distinctive brand features.").
12. If the statistics Jim Gibson cites are at all representative, such an expectation of licensed use
is entirely realistic. See Gibson, supra note 4, at 924 (citing a 1983 study in which 91.2 percent of res-
pondents agreed that "[n]o product can bear the name of an entertainer, cartoon character, or some
other famous person unless permission is given for its use by the owner of the name or character").
13. Of course consumers in this situation may not care whether the use was licensed. But trade-
mark law has no materiality element; liability does not depend on consumers caring.
14. See, e.g., Packman v. Chi. Tribune Co., 267 F.3d 628. 640 (7th Cir. 2001) (describing the Chi-
cago Tribune's use of "The joy of six" as a newspaper headline in contradiction to a trademark).
15. Courts might well be reluctant to impose liability in such cases, and particularly to issue in-
junctive relief. Any limitations, however, would have to come from the force of the First Amendment.
Trademark theory offers no reason to limit liability in such a case, committed as it is to protecting con-
sumer understanding.
No. 31
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source, and therefore qualifies as a trademark use, only by reference to
consumer understanding. This is a problem, as I argue in Part V, because
"source" in modern trademark law is a much broader concept than it was
in the traditional era, and one without any natural limits. Consequently,
trademark use can no longer exert whatever limiting influence it once
did. To develop sustainable boundaries, courts will therefore have to di-
vorce the scope of trademark rights from consumer understanding in at
least some circumstances and/or define relevant source relationships with
greater specificity. I offer some tentative suggestions along these lines in
Part VI.
II. THE ROLE OF USE IN TRADITIONAL TRADEMARK DOCTRINE
This Part describes the role of trademark use in traditional trade-
mark law, specifically during the nineteenth and early twentieth centu-
ries, when trademark law developed in America. 6 Focusing on this by-
gone era is important for two reasons. First, both advocates and critics of
the trademark use doctrine make historical claims to bolster their argu-
ments. Advocates argue that courts have always required trademark use
as a condition of liability and that the trademark use requirement has
traditionally served as a bulwark against overly expansive trademark
protection. 7 Because of the doctrine, they suggest, a grocery store can
place generic sodas on the shelf next to Coca-Colas, and content creators
can reference trademarks for purposes of criticism or parody without in-
curring liability.'" Critics of the trademark use doctrine, on the other
hand, "find no foundation for the theory in current U.S. trademark law"' 9
and deem historical arguments in favor of the doctrine unavailing. In
fact, the critics suggest history casts serious doubt on the claim that a
trademark use doctrine will promote certainty."0 To evaluate these com-
peting arguments, one must understand the context of traditional doc-
trinal rules and their evolution during the twentieth century.
Second, and more importantly for this Article, revisiting early
trademark decisions draws out the stark contrast between courts' tradi-
tional conception of "source" and the much more expansive modern un-
derstanding of that concept. Focusing on the way courts broadened the
concept of source makes clear why a functional trademark use require-
ment can no longer be the robust limitation it once might have been.
16. See McKenna, supra note 4, at 1858-73.
17. See Barrett, supra note 1, at 376-87; Dogan & Lemley, supra note 1, at 1675 ("The recent
trademark use decisions, therefore, are simply articulating and refining a longstanding principle of
trademark law that finds support in both the Lanham Act and relevant case law, a principle that was,
until recently, so widely accepted that trademark owners never sought to challenge it.").
18. Dogan & Lemley, supra note 1, at 1672.
19. Dinwoodie & Janis, supra note 5, at 1602, 1622.
20. Id. at 1607.
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A. Use Requirements in Traditional Trademark Law and Theory
Trademark rights traditionally have been defined by a party's use.
One acquires rights in a mark through use of the mark in connection with
particular goods or services, and priority as between competing users is
determined by first use.21
A party's use of a mark also delineates the scope of that party's
rights. Traditionally, one's rights in a mark extended only to the specific
goods or services with which the mark was used.22 Consequently, only
uses by direct competitors were deemed infringing.23 Trademark rights
are no longer so restricted, but a senior party's use of its mark continues
to play an anchoring role. Uses of a mark for noncompeting goods may
infringe if they are likely to cause confusion, and the similarity of the par-
ties' respective goods or services plays a prominent role in the confusion
analysis.24
"Use" in this context refers to a particular type of use, however, and
not simply any use of a term or device in connection with a party's goods
or services. Specifically, for "use" of a term to trigger substantive trade-
mark rights, a party must use the term in such a manner that consumers
regard it as indicative of the source of that party's goods or services.
25
These use rules have deep historical roots,26 and they continue
largely to determine trademark rights today. 7 Because trademark law's
use rules were primarily created during the nineteenth century, however,
the role of use in trademark law must be understood in the context of
courts' understanding of the normative goals of trademark and unfair
competition law during that period.
21. 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 2:9
(4th ed. 2008).
22. McKenna, supra note 4, at 1888.
23. See id. at 1889.
24. Every federal circuit court applies its own multifactor test of likelihood of confusion to de-
termine liability. There is, however, significant overlap between the various tests, and every circuit
includes factors that measure the similarity of the goods or services. Most also consider the likelihood
that the plaintiff would expand its offerings to the defendant's market. See 4 MCCARTHY, supra note
21, §§ 24:30-:43 (setting forth each circuit's multifactor test).
25. See McKenna, supra note 4, at 1892-93.
26. See, e.g., Am. Washboard Co. v. Saginaw Mfg. Co., 103 F. 281, 287 (6th Cir. 1900) ("It is the
party who uses [a designation] first as a brand for his goods, and builds up a business under it, who is
entitled to protection, and not the one who first thought of using it on similar goods, but did not use it.
The law deals with acts, not intentions." (quoting George v. Smith. 52 F. 830, 832 (C.C.S.D.N.Y.
1892))).
27. One qualification is necessary here. Since 1988 parties have been able to apply to register
trademarks prior to making actual use as long as they have a bona fide intention to use the mark. See
Lanham Act § 1(b), 15 U.S.C. § 1051(b) (2006). If such applications issue to registration, their owners
can claim constructive use of the registered mark from the date of application. Id. § 7(c). But since
intent to use applications cannot mature into registration unless the applicant can demonstrate actual
use within the statutorily prescribed period, even rights acquired through intent-based registrations
ultimately depend on actual use of a mark. Id. § 1(d) (requiring statement of use to be filed within
statutory period following notice of allowance).
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Notably, traditional trademark law's focus on use is difficult to ex-
plain in terms of the modern search costs theory of trademark law. First,
contrary to the conventional claim, advanced by Dinwoodie and Janis,28
use is neither a necessary nor sufficient determinant of consumer under-
standing. Here I mean to suggest that a party need not have made any
use of a term for consumers to associate the term with that particular
party, but it is particularly clear that consumer understanding does not
depend on any formal aspects of use like affixation.29 In fact, as courts
have increasingly embraced the search costs theory of trademark law,
they have sometimes relaxed the use rules and recognized a party's rights
in a mark even when that party had never itself made any use of the
mark.30 At the same time, actual use of a trademark in a way typically
deemed sufficient to support an application does not guarantee that con-
sumers will associate a term with its first user; the nature of one's use
tells us nothing about consumer response to the mark.
It is ironic then that the trademark use doctrine is promoted so vi-
gorously by vocal advocates of the search costs theory.31 Applied woo-.
denly, use rules almost certainly will produce results in some cases that
are inconsistent with consumer expectations. That would not have bo-
thered courts applying traditional trademark principles because those
courts did not seek to protect consumer understanding for its own sake.
But use rules that are insensitive to actual consumer understanding stand
in tension with a search costs theory of trademark law.
28. See Dinwoodie & Janis, supra note 5, at 1626.
29. As Rebecca Tushnet notes, "As far as we know, the brain has no use-in-commerce require-
ment or other distinction that would keep references to Tiffany-the-girl from activating thoughts of
Tiffany's-the-jeweler, or vice versa." Rebecca Tushnet, Gone in Sixty Milliseconds: Trademark Law
and Cognitive Science, 86 TEX. L. REV. 507, 549 (2008).
30. In a variety of cases, courts have recognized trademark rights in abbreviations or nicknames
used exclusively by the public. See Nat'l Cable Television Ass'n v. Am. Cinema Editors, Inc., 937 F.2d
1572, 1577-78 (Fed. Cir. 1991) ("Moreover, even without use directly by the claimant of the rights, the
courts and the Board generally have recognized that abbreviations and nicknames of trademarks or
names used only by the public give rise to protectable rights in the owners of the trade name or mark
which the public modified. Such public use by others inures to the claimant's benefit and, where this
occurs, public use can reasonably be deemed use 'by' that party in the sense of a use on its behalf."
(footnote omitted)); see also Johnny Blastoff, Inc. v. LA. Rams Football Co., 188 F.3d 427, 434 (7th
Cir. 1999) (quoting Nat'l Cable Television, 937 F.2d at 1577); Volkswagenwerk AG v. Hoffman, 489 F.
Supp. 678, 681 (D.S.C. 1980) (recognizing VW's rights in "Bug" based on public usage of the nickname
without VW's protest); Coca-Cola Co. v. Busch, 44 F. Supp. 405, 407 (E.D. Pa. 1942) (finding the pub-
lic use of "Coke" to refer to Coca-Cola's soft drink sufficient to create rights for Coca-Cola in that
term); Am. Stock Exch., Inc. v. Am. Express Co., 1980 WL 30139, at *362--64 (T.T.A.B. June 30, 1980)
(attributing to American Express rights in "AMEX" based on public use of that designation to denote
American Express); Norac Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 1977 WL 22645, at *315 (T.T.A.B. Dec.
15, 1977) (earlier use of "OXY" by public determined priority); Pieper v. Playboy Enters., 1973 WL
19991, at *320 (T.T.A.B. June 14, 1973) (recognizing Playboy's rights in "Bunny Club").
31. Dogan and Lemley in particular have pressed the search costs rationale. See Dogan & Lem-
ley, supra note 1, at 1689; Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, A Search-Costs Theory of Limiting
Doctrines in Trademark Law, 97 TRADEMARK REP. 1223 (2007); Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley,
The Merchandising Right: Fragile Theory or Fait Accompli?, 54 EMORY L.J. 461,466-67 (2005) [herei-
nafter The Merchandising Right]; Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Trademarks and Consumer
Search Costs on the Internet, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 777 (2004).
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The following Section looks closely at the concept of "trademark
use" in two areas of traditional trademark law: (1) the use necessary to
establish trademark rights, and (2) the types of uses that were deemed
infringing. As this Section demonstrates, the vast majority of "use" cases
from this era focused on the question of whether a claimed designation
functioned as a trademark, indicating the source of the claimant's goods
32or services. For this reason alone, traditional trademark use precedent
has limited value in the modem trademark use debate. As Dinwoodie
and Janis note, use need not have the same significance in the infringe-
ment context as it does in defining a party's rights.33
More importantly, traditional use precedent at most helps define
the class of cases that would have been considered trademark infringe-
ment. The precedent does not help resolve the ultimate question of lia-
bility because parties in the traditional era that lacked trademark rights
could still get relief in many cases through unfair competition claims.
Thus, trademark use advocates who rely on acquisition precedent from
this era mischaracterize the precedent to the extent they suggest it ab-
solves non-trademark uses categorically.
B. Use and the Nature of Rights
Cases from the traditional era dealing with the issue of use generally
were decided at a time when courts divided the universe of distinguishing
terms into "technical trademarks," which were protected in actions for
trademark infringement, and "trade names," which could be protected
only in actions for unfair competition.34 This distinction appeared at
some point in the late nineteenth century, around the time Congress be-
gan to legislate in the trademark area." Technical trademark status was
important because only those marks could be registered under early fed-
eral statutes, and only owners of registered trademarks could assert fed-
eral claims.36 In this context, "trademark use" was the type of use neces-
32. See Dinwoodie & Janis, supra note 5, at 1610. Barrett concedes that "the case law provides
relatively little discussion of when a defendant 'uses a mark as a trademark' for purposes of infringe-
ment liability." Barrett, supra note 1, at 378. She also later concedes that inconsistency between the
language of section 32 and the definition of "use in commerce" makes it possible that "the literal lan-
guage of the section 45 'use in commerce' definition is limited to defining the acts necessary to gain
ownership and registration of a mark." Id. at 385. Barrett nevertheless concludes that "the trademark
use requirement is well-established in statutory language and case law, and it serves a separate and
distinct purpose in shaping trademark rights." Id. at 378.
33. Dinwoodie & Janis, supra note 5, at 1614.
34. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 9 (1995); see 1 MCCARTHY, supra note
21, § 4:4 (defining technical trademarks).
35. One can reasonably question whether this period is the appropriate reference point for "tra-
ditional" trademark principles, since trademark and unfair competition law significantly predate fed-
eral legislation and virtually none of the pre-Lanham Act precedent imposed such formal require-
ments. But even focusing on this era as the appropriate reference point, trademark use advocates
overemphasize the significance of a determination that a plaintiff could not claim exclusive rights in a
trademark.
36. See McKenna, supra note 4, at 1862-63.
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sary to achieve technical trademark status, and it had both formal and
substantive dimensions.
Formally, a technical trademark was affixed to a product itself, or at
least the product's packaging or other closely related materials. Each of
the first three federal trademark statutes required some form of applica-
tion of the mark as a prerequisite to registration,37 and courts considering
the validity of a plaintiff's claimed designation focused on affixation and
other aspects of the plaintiff's manner of use. 8 The affixation require-
ment was consistent with courts' understanding of trademarks as "some-
thing other than, and separate from, the merchandise.""
Affixing a term to products did not guarantee that it would be
deemed a technical trademark, however, because not all terms were ca-
pable of serving as technical trademarks. Only arbitrary or fanciful terms
could be technical trademarks; surnames and descriptive terms could not
be so classified.4" Those terms were designated "trade names" and were
protected, if at all, in actions for unfair competition.4
This distinction between technical trademarks and trade names was
part of a delicate balance courts struck to limit the scope of trademark
protection. All of unfair competition law, including trademark law, was
designed to prevent trade diversion by competitors.4" But courts recog-
nized that they had to be careful in denouncing trade diversion, because
trade diversion is the essence of competition. Applied too broadly, un-
fair competition law could undermine the benefits of a market economy
by condemning many efforts to compete. Courts guarded against over-
extension by carefully distinguishing between legitimate forms of compe-
37. The Trademark Act of 1870 required a statement of the "mode in which [the mark] has been
or is intended to be applied and used." Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 77, 16 Stat. 198, 210 (1870). The
Supreme Court declared the Act of 1870 unconstitutional in the Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 97-99
(1879). Later statutes passed in 1881 and 1905 required a party seeking registration to file a statement
of the mode in which the mark was applied or affixed to the goods and the length of time during which
the trademark had been used. Trademark Act of 1881, ch. 138, § 1, 21 Stat. 502, 503 (1881), super-
ceded by Pub. L. No. 58-84, 33 Stat. 724, 724 (1905), repealed by Lanham Act, Pub. L. No. 79-489,
§ 46(a), 60 Stat. 427,444 (1946) (codified as amended in various sections of 15 U.S.C. (2006)).
38. See infra notes 57-64 and accompanying text.
39. Davis v. Davis, 27 F. 490,492 (C.C.D. Mass. 1886).
40. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 9 (1995); see also 1 MCCARTHY, supra
note 21, § 4:4 (defining technical trademarks as marks that were "fanciful, arbitrary, distinctive, non-
descriptive in any sense and not a personal name").
41. 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 21, § 4:5.
42. See Lawrence Mfg. Co. v. Tenn. Mfg. Co., 138 U.S. 537, 546 (1891) ("[l1n all cases where
rights to the exclusive use of a trade-mark are invaded, it is invariably held that the essence of the
wrong consists in the sale of the goods of one manufacturer or vendor as those of another; and that it
is only when this false representation is directly or indirectly made that the party who appeals to a
court of equity can have relief. This is the doctrine of all the authorities."); see also Hanover Star Mil-
ling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 413 (1916) ("Th[e] essential element is the same in trade-mark cases
as in cases of unfair competition unaccompanied with trade-mark infringement."); JAMES LOVE
HOPKINS, THE LAW OF TRADEMARKS, TRADENAMES AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 4, at 12 (1905)
("The principles involved in trademark cases and tradename cases have been substantially identical.").
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tition ("mere competition") and illegitimate attempts to divert trade.
Deceptiveness was the point of demarcation. 3
Put differently, producers were protected in this era only against at-
tempts to divert their trade by competitors who deceived consumers
about the source of goods or services. That type of illegitimate trade di-
version was possible only when the claimed designation clearly indicated
the source of a party's goods or services. Only then could "he who first
adopted it be injured by any appropriation or imitation of it by others,
[or] the public be deceived" by a third party who "induc[ed] the public to
purchase the goods and manufactures of one person supposing them to
be those of another." 44
Certain designations -arbitrary or fanciful terms affixed to particu-
lar products-clearly did "point distinctively to the origin or ownership
of the article to which [they were] applied. '45 And because those terms
provided no direct information about the products with which they were
used, courts could safely conclude that a competitor's later use of the
same term lacked a legitimate explanation and was likely to deceive con-
sumers.
A descriptive term, by contrast, might denote "class, grade, style, or
quality of the articles '46 sold by a producer. Consumers therefore might
not use such a term as an indication of source at all. Even if they did as-
cribe some source significance to a descriptive term, competitors had le-
gitimate reasons to use those terms to describe their own products.
Courts therefore could not presume, without risking interference with
mere competition, that use of a mark similar to a producer's trade name
would divert consumers at all, or that any diversion that did result was
illegitimate. Accordingly, in order to prevail, a trade name plaintiff had
to prove the defendant intended to divert his trade.47
C. The (In)significance of Technical Trademark Status
As the foregoing Section explained, the distinction courts drew be-
tween trademarks and trade names was a pragmatic one. But important-
ly, and in contrast to the significance modern trademark use proponents
would ascribe to a finding of no trademark use, the distinction was not
necessarily outcome determinative. While use of another's trade name
could not be condemned categorically, such use could be condemned in
particular circumstances with more evidence of illegitimacy. Specifically,
a trade name plaintiff (one who, by definition, had not made "trademark
43. McKenna, supra note 4, at 1906.
44. Lawrence Mfg., 138 U.S. at 546 (quoting Canal Co. v. Clark, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 311, 322
(1871)).
45. See id. at 546-47 ("[T]he office of a trade-mark is to point out distinctively the origin or own-
ership of the article to which it is affixed .. " (quoting Canal Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 322)).
46. Diederich v. W. Schneider Wholesale Wine & Liquor Co., 195 F. 35, 37 (8th Cir. 1912).
47. Id. at 37-38.
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use" of the claimed term) could prevail against a competitor's use of the
trade name if it could prove the competitor intended to pass off its prod-
ucts as those of the plaintiff."a
In fact, in virtually all of the cases cited by trademark use advocates
as examples of courts imposing a trademark use requirement, the courts
explicitly recognized that plaintiffs lacking technical trademark rights
were free to pursue claims of unfair competition. For example, Barrett
points to Diederich v. W. Schneider Wholesale Wine & Liquor Co. 9 as
evidence that trademark use required affixation." Yet it is clear in that
case that the plaintiff's failure to make trademark use meant only that it
had to go the extra step of proving passing off. As the court noted,
"Words not actually affixed to the goods frequently constitute trade-
names, and are protected as such against unfair competition."5 Indeed,
the court thought it was "quite probable that complainant state[d], in its
bill, a cause of action against defendant for unfair trade."52
Thus, even if these cases from the traditional trademark era-which
focused on the nature of the plaintiff's rights-help define a modern con-
cept of trademark use, they do not support any kind of ipso facto rule
that non-trademark uses are not actionable. Trademark use in this era
was necessary to receive a federal registration.53 Owning a registration
meant that one could assert a federal trademark infringement claim.54
Technical trademark status also entitled the owner to a presumption that
the defendant's use of the mark was intended to divert the owner's
trade.5 But parties with interests in mere trade names were able to get
relief against competitors' use of their trade name.56 Those plaintiffs
simply had to assert state law unfair competition claims, which required
evidence of intent to pass off and which, in the absence of diversity, were
relegated to state court.
48. This distinction was a more formal version of a distinction some English courts drew between
cases in which the plaintiff could prove exclusive title to a mark (in which case equity would act to en-
join others' use of the mark immediately and without evidence of fraud) and those in which the plain-
tiff could not demonstrate title (in which case equity would not act until the plaintiff had established at
law that the defendant nevertheless acted to divert his trade). See McKenna, supra note 4, at 1856-58.
49. Diederich, 195 F. 35.
50. Barrett, supra note 1, at 379. The court noted in Diederich that "[a] trade-mark owes its exis-
tence to the fact that it is actually affixed to a vendable commodity." 195 F. at 37 (quoting Hazelton
Boiler Co. v. Hazelton Tripod Boiler Co., 30 N.E. 339, 344-45 (1892)).
51. Diederich, 195 F. at 37.
52. Id. at 38. The court did not rule on any unfair trade claim, however, because it lacked subject
matter jurisdiction over such state law claim, the parties being residents of the same state. Id. at 38.
53. See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 21, §§ 5:6-:10.
54. See id.; see also Standard Paint Co. v. Trinidad Asphalt Mfg. Co., 220 U.S. 446, 457 (1911)
(discussing jurisdiction).
55. See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 21, §§ 5:6-:10.
56. Armstrong Paint & Varnish Works v. Nu-Enamel Corp., 305 U.S. 315, 325 (1938) ("If it is a
properly registered trade-mark, a ground to support the action is violation of the Trade-Mark Act. If
it is not a properly registered trade-mark, the ground is unfair competition at common law. The facts
supporting a suit for infringement and one for unfair competition are substantially the same.").
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The only cases that even arguably support a categorical exclusion
from protection are some early trade dress cases in which courts rejected
plaintiffs' claims to exclusive use of particular packaging or design fea-
tures. Though they sometimes drew inspiration from the rule that
trademarks were separate and distinct from the goods,57 courts in these
cases primarily were concerned about the competitive consequences of
allowing exclusive rights in unpatented design features. In Davis v. Da-
vis,58 for example, the court rejected the plaintiff's claim of rights in its
arrangement of bars of soap (which were wrapped in colored paper) on
the ground that the plaintiff seemed to be claiming "a patent for an idea,
under the guise of the registration of a trade-mark."59 Similarly in Har-
rington v. Libbyf' the court rejected the plaintiff's claim to exclusive use
of "a tin pail with a bail or handle to it ... used to contain paper collars
for sale and sold with the collars" because to "recognize an exclusive
right to an unpatented package" would allow "[t]he forms and materials
of packages to contain articles of merchandise ... [to] be rapidly taken
up and appropriated by dealers, until some one, bolder than the others,
might go to the very root of things, and claim for his goods the primitive
brown paper and tow string, as a peculiar property."61
This concern about the use of unfair competition law to protect un-
patented design features now finds primary expression in the functionali-
ty doctrine. That doctrine, which both promotes competition in advanta-
geous design features and channels protection for useful features to
patent law, disqualifies from trade dress protection features that are "es-
sential to the use or purpose of the article or... [affect] the cost or quali-
ty of the article."62 Notably, functional features may not be protected by
trademark law even if they designate source.
57. See, e.g., Moorman v. Hoge, 17 F. Cas. 715, 718 (C.C.D. Cal. 1871) (No. 9783) (rejecting
plaintiff's claim of rights in its distinctively shaped barrels in which plaintiff shipped its whiskey, be-
cause a trademark "must be a mark, impressed, cut, engraved, stamped, cast upon, or in some way
wrapped around, or appended to, the article, or the package, as something independent of the article
itself, or the package used to contain it").
58. 27 F. 490 (C.C.D. Mass. 1886).
59. Id. at 492; see also Diamond Match Co. v. Saginaw Match Co., 142 F. 727, 729-30 (6th Cir.
1906) (rejecting plaintiff's claim of exclusive right in tipped matches with partly red and partly blue
heads on the ground that "the two colors ... serve not only a useful purpose but an essential function,"
and noting that, even though the plaintiff limited its claim to heads of two particular colors, the gener-
al rule was that color could not be monopolized to distinguish a product given the limited number of
primary colors).
60. 11 F. Cas. 605 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1877) (No. 6107).
61. Id. at 605-06.
62. TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 32 (2001) (quoting Qualitex Co. v.
Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 165 (1995)). A feature might also be deemed aesthetically func-
tional "[wihen aesthetic considerations play an important role in the purchasing decisions of prospec-
tive consumers" and the design feature "substantially contributes to the aesthetic appeal of a product."
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 17 cmt. c (1995). Unlike cases of mechanical
functionality, courts in aesthetic functionality cases focus primarily on whether exclusive use of the
claimed feature would put competitors at a "significant non-reputation-related disadvantage." Traf-
Fix, 532 U.S. at 32 (quoting Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 165).
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D. Trademark Use and Infringement
As noted above, the overwhelming majority of use cases in the tra-
ditional era focused on the nature of the plaintiff's rights. Very few cases
even mentioned formal aspects of the defendant's use. Moreover, even
in cases that did address the defendant's use, it was the nature of the
plaintifs use of the claimed trademark that determined the outcome.
In Air-Brush Manufacturing Co. v. Thayer,63 for example, the court
noted that the defendant could not have committed trademark infringe-
ment because it had not "affixed complainant's registered mark to mer-
chandise of substantially the same descriptive properties," as the govern-
ing federal trademark statute required.' But the court had already
concluded that the plaintiff had no technical trademark rights in "air
brush" because the term was, at best, merely descriptive of the plaintiff's
products and the plaintiff had never used the term to denote the origin of
its goods.65 Consequently, the plaintiff in that case could not have sus-
tained a trademark infringement claim regardless of how the defendant
had used the mark.
The lack of case law addressing the nature of a defendant's use
presents something of a puzzle. Unlike the current Lanham Act, the ear-
ly trademark statutes clearly made affixation a necessary condition of in-
fringing use.66 Why, then, would we find so little case law in which the
defendant's affixation was really at issue? I suggest at least two reasons
for the paucity of case law.
First, use of a mark in a manner not attached to one's goods was un-
likely to implicate the narrow purposes of traditional trademark law.
Recall that courts in this era were concerned only about preventing dis-
honest trade diversion.67 Because trade diversion is a risk only when
consumers believe that the products they are buying from the defendant
actually come from the plaintiff, courts in this era recognized as actiona-
ble only confusion about the actual, historical source of a product.68
They did not recognize confusion as to "sponsorship or affiliation" or
any other type of relationship between the plaintiff and defendant. Use
of a mark apart from one's products was unlikely to be challenged in this
legal environment because such uses were unlikely to cause confusion at
the point of sale about the actual source of a product.
Second, as discussed above, not nearly as much rode on the trade-
mark use determination as modern proponents suggest. While the early
63. 84 F. 640 (C.C.N.D. I11. 1897).
64. Id. at 641.
65. Id. at 640-41.
66. See supra note 37.
67. Coats v. Holbrook, Nelson & Co., 7 N.Y. Ch. Ann. 713, 717 (1845) (describing as trademark
law's purpose preventing a defendant from "attract[ing] to himself the patronage that without such
deceptive use of such names ... would have inured to the benefit of [the plaintiff]").
68. McKenna, supra note 4, at 1866.
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trademark statutes required that a defendant somehow affix the com-
plainant's mark to its packages or related materials in order to commit
trademark infringement, other types of uses could well have constituted
unfair competition.
In Air-Brush, for example, the court concluded that the plaintiff
lacked trademark rights in "air brush" and that the defendant could not
be liable for trademark infringement under the federal statute because it
had not affixed the term to its products.69 Nevertheless, the court made
clear that the outcome pertained strictly to trademark infringement and
that the plaintiff very likely had a viable claim of unfair competition on
the same facts. In Diederich, the court held that the plaintiff did not have
trademark rights in the term "905" when it used that term only on a sign
upon a building, and a defendant using the term in the same manner
therefore could not be deemed to infringe the plaintiff's trademark
rights."0 Yet that court too stressed that, even if the defendant's use did
not amount to trademark infringement, it could well have constituted un-
fair competition.71
Plaintiffs in this era surely understood that lack of technical trade-
mark rights was not fatal and simply pleaded cases that did not involve
affixation as unfair competition cases. Though they would have had to
prove intent to divert trade to sustain their unfair competition claims,
plaintiffs in those cases could get the same relief as in trademark in-
fringement cases. Consequently, courts probably did not often have to
confront the question of whether the defendant made technically infring-
ing use.72
E. Functional Trademark Use and Infringement
While the formal aspects of trademark use, and particularly the af-
fixation requirement, have been overemphasized by some trademark use
proponents, there is a more relevant sense in which courts in the tradi-
tional era addressed the nature of a defendant's use. Though they did
69. 84 F. at 641.
70. Diederich v. W. Schneider Wholesale Wine & Liquor Co., 195 F. 35, 38 (8th Cir. 1912). Inte-
restingly, the dissent in Diederich attempted to distinguish the type of use necessary for registration
from the type of use necessary to infringe. Id. at 40-41 (Sanborn, J., dissenting) (noting that, while the
Acts of 1881 and 1905 required the applicant to file a statement of his trademark and "the mode in
which the same is applied and affixed to goods," the 1905 Act made actionable affixing the mark to
"merchandise of substantially the same descriptive properties as those set forth in the registration, or
to labels, signs, prints, packages, wrappers, or receptacles intended to be used upon or in connection with
the sale of merchandise" (emphasis added)).
71. Neither court was able to exercise jurisdiction over potential state law unfair competition
claims, however, since diversity was lacking in both cases. See Diederich, 195 F. at 38; Air-Brush, 84 F.
at 641.
72. Moreover, because advertising was relatively undeveloped in the early and mid-nineteenth
century, there were relatively fewer circumstances in which another party might have made use of a
mark apart from the goods. See Robert G. Bone, Hunting Goodwill: A History of the Concept of
Goodwill in Trademark Law, 86 B.U. L. REv. 547, 575-79 (2006) (describing the growth of advertising
between 1860 and the 1920s), and the sources cited therein.
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not use the phrase "trademark use" in this context, courts were clear that
liability depended on a defendant making a certain kind of use of anoth-
er's mark.
As noted above, courts in the traditional era denied descriptive
terms technical trademark status because those terms have ordinary,
non-trademark meanings in addition to whatever source significance they
might have acquired. Because of this potential dual meaning, courts
could not conclude solely on the basis of the defendant's use of the dis-
puted term that consumers who purchased products from the defendant
were deceived and otherwise would have patronized the plaintiff. Addi-
tionally, competitors had honest reasons, unrelated to source identifica-
tion, for using certain terms. Descriptive terms, for example, identified
qualities of particular products, which sellers of those products might le-
gitimately have wanted to convey to consumers.
To avoid interfering with legitimate uses, courts had to differentiate
between uses of a term in its source-designating (trademark) capacity
and uses of the term in its ordinary, non-source-designating capacity.73
And because both types of uses were possible, courts could not infer
source designation from the simple fact of the defendant's use, as they
did in the context of technical trademarks.74 Unfair competition clai-
mants therefore had to prove that the defendant's use was likely to dece-
ive consumers and to divert trade that otherwise would have gone to the
claimant.
Moreover, as an added precaution to ensure room for parties to use
descriptive terms in their ordinary sense, courts did not bar defendants
from using trade names altogether, even in cases where they were con-
cerned that a defendant's use might create confusion. Instead, courts
crafted precise remedies, often requiring only disclaimers or other visual
material that would clearly distinguish the source of the defendant's
goods.75
73. See, e.g., Avery & Sons v. Meikle & Co., 4 Ky. L. Rptr. 759, 763 (1883) (noting that the law
allows use of terms that are common property for the ideas that those terms commonly express, so
long as the use is not misleading).
74. See Elgin Nat'l Watch Co. v. I11. Watch Case Co., 179 U.S. 665, 673-74 (1901) (noting that
competitors have good reasons to use terms in their primary sense but cannot use terms to divert a
producer's trade); Alff v. Radam, 14 S.W. 164, 164 (Tex. 1890) (noting that a party has "no right to
appropriate a sign or symbol which, from the nature of the fact it is used to signify, others may employ
with equal truth, and therefore have an equal right to employ, for the same purpose" but allowing for
the possibility that a plaintiff might nevertheless prevail in such a case if the defendants intentionally
simulated the peculiar device or symbol employed by the plaintiff to deceive consumers); Thompson v.
Montgomery, (1889) 41 Ch.D. 35, 50, af'd, [1891] A.C. 217 (H.L.) (U.K.) (holding that the plaintiff
had no exclusive right to the use of "Stone Ale" alone as against the world, or any right to prevent the
defendant from selling his goods as having been made at Stone, but could prevail against a defendant
who used the words fraudulently to pass off its goods).
75. See, e.g., Herring-Hall-Marvin Safe Co. v. Hall's Safe Co., 208 U.S. 554, 560 (1908) (modify-
ing decree to "forbid the use of the name 'Hall,' either alone or in combination, in corporate name, on
safes, or in advertisements, unless accompanied by information that the defendant is not the original
Hall's Safe & Lock Company or its successor, or, as the case may be, that the article is not the product
of the last-named company or its successors"); W.R. Speare Co. v. Speare, 265 F. 876, 880 (D.C. Cir.
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These remedies were sufficient because courts in the traditional era
understood "source" to refer only to the actual producer of a product.
When a court ordered a defendant to distinguish the source of its prod-
ucts clearly, it meant only that the defendant had to make clear that it
was not the plaintiff. One cannot be sure that a defendant's use will di-
vert customers that otherwise would have gone to the mark owner unless
the defendant's use is likely to deceive consumers into believing that it is
the mark owner. It would not do to show that consumers might believe
that the defendant had some other type of relationship with the mark
owner.
The realities of nineteenth century commerce undoubtedly drove
this conception of "source" to a large degree. Courts developed the tra-
ditional framework at a time when producers sold relatively few types of
products or services in limited geographic areas and when advertising
was only in its infancy.76 The commercial landscape changed rapidly in
the early twentieth century, as producers began serving much wider mar-
kets, both geographically and in terms of the products and services they
offered.77 This changing commercial reality put pressure on courts to ex-
pand the range of uses against which trademark law would respond.
Most significantly, mark owners wanted protection for their marks
against noncompetitive goods and services.
Beginning around 1920, courts started to respond to this pressure
and recognize mark owners' claims against noncompetitors, even though
those parties obviously could not divert trade.78 Doing so, however, re-
quired some doctrinal maneuvering; in particular, it required courts to
construe "source" more broadly.
When a mark owner did not produce the same goods as the defen-
dant, consumers would not buy the defendant's products believing they
came from the plaintiff. But consumers might well believe the producer
1920) (reversing the decree of the lower court and directing the lower court "to enter a decree prohi-
biting the [defendant] ... from using the word 'Speare' as the name, or part of the name, of their busi-
ness as undertakers, or in advertisements, telephone directories, signs, or statements of any nature,
unless accompanied by the words 'neither the successors of, nor connected with, the original W. R.
Speare establishment,' in appropriate juxtaposition therewith, and in conspicuous letters, and from
making any statement, oral or otherwise, that they or any one of them is continuing the original busi-
ness formerly done by W. R. Speare under that name at 940 F street, N. W., and now carried on by the
defendants, or that they have any privity or connection by succession, inheritance, or otherwise, with
said business, or that said original business is no longer in existence or is not being continued by the
plaintiff herein").
76. See Bone, supra note 72, at 575-79.
77. See id. at 576-79.
78. See, e.g., Yale Elec. Corp. v. Robertson, 26 F.2d 972, 974 (2d Cir. 1928) (acknowledging that
the decision did "some violence to the language" of the statute, but refusing to allow registration of
Yale for flashlights and batteries in light of the plaintiff's prior use of the Yale mark for locks and
claiming "it ha[d] come to be recognized that, unless the borrower's use is so foreign to the owner's as
to insure against any identification of the two, it is unlawful"); Aunt Jemima Mills Co. v. Rigney &
Co., 247 F. 407, 409-10 (2d Cir. 1917) (finding that while "no one wanting syrup could possibly be
made to take flour," the products were "so related as to fall within the mischief which equity should
prevent").
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of those noncompetitive products was related to the mark owner in some
way. By redefining the "source" of a product to include related or affi-
liated parties, courts could capture confusion about a wider range of rela-
tionships between the plaintiff and defendant while continuing to insist
that trademark infringement required confusion as to "source."
Also contributing to the redefinition of source was the pressure
courts felt to accommodate the emerging practice of mark owners licens-
ing production of products that bore their marks. Licensing posed se-
rious conceptual problems because trademark law traditionally con-
demned uses that deceived consumers about the actual source of
products. When plaintiffs that had licensed production of goods bearing
their marks sought to enforce their trademark rights, courts were faced
with two parties, neither of which was the actual source of the products
bearing the mark at issue. It was difficult for courts in these cases to see
how a mark owner deserved relief when it arguably was engaging in the
same type of deception as the accused infringer. It was also difficult to
see how the defendant's use diverted consumers who otherwise would
have gone to the mark owner when the mark owner was not, in fact, the
source of the products bearing its mark. For this reason, licensing tradi-
tionally was forbidden.79
But courts in the early twentieth century increasingly had difficulty
accepting that outsourcing production to affiliates or licensees was illegi-
timate. To distinguish uses by affiliated companies from infringing uses
by third parties, courts gradually loosened the restrictions on licensing.
They did so primarily by reconceptualizing what it meant to be the
"source" of a product. Courts began to hold that a mark owner could be
considered the "source" of the goods if it exercised sufficient control
over the quality of those goods even when it did not actually produce the
goods bearing its mark.8"
Congress later codified this understanding of source in section 5 of
the Lanham Act, which provides that use of a mark by "related compa-
nies" inures to the benefit of the mark owner.81 A "related company" in
this context is one "whose use of a mark is controlled by the owner of the
mark with respect to the nature and quality of the goods or services on or
in connection with which the mark is used."82 Thus, in modern terms, the
legal source of a product is not necessarily the actual producer of the
product but instead the entity exercising control over its quality. That
legal source might be related to the actual producer only by contract.
79. See McKenna, supra note 4, at 1893-95.
80. See, e.g., Keebler Weyl Baking Co. v. J.S. Ivins' Son, Inc., 7 F. Supp. 211, 214 (E.D. Pa. 1934)
("An article need not be actually manufactured by the owner of the trade-mark it being enough that it
is manufactured under his supervision and according to his directions thus securing both the right of
the owner and the right of the public.").
81. Lanham Act § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 1055 (2006).
82. See id. § 45.
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Courts' conceptions of source in these two contexts (infringement
and licensing) were deliberately symmetrical. If a mark owner is not the
actual producer of the goods sold under its mark, it can not very well
contend that a defendant's use of the same mark misleads consumers
about the source of its goods any more than the mark owner's own prac-
tice. But a mark owner can claim that consumers would assume that the
defendant, like the mark owner's licensees, operates under the mark
owner's control. The defendant's use, in other words, might cause confu-
sion as to whether the mark owner sponsored or was affiliated with the
defendant or its goods.
Understanding how courts' conception of source evolved during this
period is critical to understanding the scope of the modern Lanham Act,
particularly with respect to the issue of trademark use. With these les-
sons in mind, the following Part analyzes the role of trademark use in the
Lanham Act and the broad notion of source in modem trademark law.
III. TRADEMARK USE IN THE MODERN LANHAM ACT
Trademark use advocates and critics apparently agree that the Lan-
ham Act does not explicitly make "trademark use" an element of in-
fringement.83 They differ over the doctrine's implicit status. Dinwoodie
and Janis argue that there is no trademark use requirement even impli-
citly in the statute and that trademark use traditionally has played a role
only with respect to the acquisition of trademark rights.' Proponents of
the doctrine, on the other hand, argue that the trademark use require-
ment has always been a foundational principle of trademark law and was
never discussed explicitly until recently simply because "the vast majority
of cases in the pre-Internet era involved defendants that clearly had used
the mark (or something like it) as a visible device in marketing their own
products.
8 1
To the extent they advance a textual argument for the trademark
use doctrine, proponents generally focus on the infringement provisions'
requirements that a defendant "use" the mark in question "in com-
merce."86 Under this reading, the infringement provisions impose three
83. See Dinwoodie & Janis, supra note 5, at 1609 ("There is no statutory language expressly sup-
porting the trademark use theory. Even proponents of the theory concede as much."). The trademark
use requirement arguably is more explicit in the recently enacted Trademark Dilution Revision Act of
2006. See Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Mark D. Janis, Dilution's (Still) Uncertain Future, 105 MICH. L.
REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 98, 100 (2006), http://students.law.umich.edu/mlr/firstimpressions/voll05/
dinwoodie.pdf ("[I]n rather ambiguous language, the act seeks to impose a requirement that an al-
leged infringer be using the plaintiff's famous mark as a mark."). I discuss trademark use and dilution
below in Part III.B.
84. Dinwoodie & Janis, supra note 5, at 1609-18.
85. Dogan & Lemley, supra note 1, at 1672.
86. Use in commerce is a requirement under both section 32 and section 43(a), though the re-
quirement is articulated somewhat differently in each section. See Lanham Act § 32(1)(a) (stating that
"[a]ny person who shall, without the consent of the registrant .... use in commerce ... shall be lia-
ble"); id. § 43(a)(1) (stating that "[a]ny person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or
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distinct requirements: (1) "use" of a trademark, (2) in commerce, (3) that
creates a likelihood of confusion. Indeed, for proponents, "use" must be
decided as a threshold matter because "while any number of activities
may be 'in commerce' or create a likelihood of confusion, no such activi-
ty is actionable under the Lanham Act absent the 'use' of a trademark."87
For this construction to hold, "use in commerce" must refer to a
particular type of use. The New York Times undoubtedly uses Micro-
soft's trademark when it publishes a story about the company and prints
Microsoft's name in the title of the article. Likewise, the defendants in
the keyword advertising cases clearly have "used" the plaintiffs' trade-
marks in some way in connection with their commercial activities.
Google, for example, sold Rescuecom's trademark as a keyword and
generated search results in response to the term.' The defendants in
these cases do not deny such use; they simply claim that their uses quali-
tatively are not the kinds of uses targeted by the Lanham Act. Use in
commerce, they argue, means use in commerce as a trademark.89
"Use in commerce" is a defined term in the Lanham Act, though
the definition is not particularly helpful here. According to section 45,
"use in commerce" is "the bona fide use of a mark in the ordinary course
of trade, and not made merely to reserve a right in a mark."'  More spe-
cifically,
a mark shall be deemed to be in use in commerce
(1) on goods when-
(A)it is placed in any manner on the goods or their containers
or the displays associated therewith or on the tags or la-
bels affixed thereto, or if the nature of the goods makes
such placement impracticable, then on documents asso-
ciated with the goods or their sale, and
(B) the goods are sold or transported in commerce, and
(2) on services when it is used or displayed in the sale or advertis-
ing of services and the services are rendered in commerce, or
the services are rendered in more than one State or in the
United States and a foreign country and the person rendering
any container for goods, uses in commerce.., shall be liable"). The newly adopted Trademark Dilu-
tion Revision Act of 2006 requires as a condition of liability "use of a mark or trade name in com-
merce that is likely to cause dilution by blurring or dilution by tarnishment of the famous mark." Id.
§ 43(c)(1).
87. 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 414 F.3d 400, 412 (2d Cir. 2005); see also Rescu-
ecom Corp. v. Google, Inc., 456 F. Supp. 2d 393,400 (N.D.N.Y. 2006).
88. See Rescuecom, 456 F. Supp. 2d at 393-94. By contrast, in another case sometimes cited for
the proposition that infringement requires trademark use, the trademark use issue had to do with the
plaintiff's rights in 1-800-HOLIDAY, while the issue in terms of infringement was whether the defen-
dant used the plaintiff's mark at all when it registered a telephone number that corresponded to 1-800-
HOLIDAY but used or promoted the number only as 1-800-405-4329. Holiday Inns, Inc. v. 800 Res-
ervation, Inc., 86 F.3d 619, 620, 624 (6th Cir. 1996).
89. See Rescuecom, 456 F. Supp. 2d at 397-98; Holiday Inns, 86 F.3d at 623.
90. Lanham Act § 45.
[Vol. 2009
TRADEMARK USE AND THE PROBLEM OF SOURCE
the services is engaged in commerce in connection with the
services.9
It seems very unlikely that Congress intended this definition of "use in
commerce" to modify the language of the infringement provisions in ad-
dition to defining the use necessary to qualify for trademark rights.92 In
fact, it is not clear that the formal criteria set forth in the definition fully
capture trademark use even in the context of acquisition. Application of
a university's logo to a T-shirt or other merchandise, for example, would
meet the formal affixation requirement, yet many commentators have
expressed doubt that such uses really do indicate the source of the mer-
chandise.93 Also, reading this provision strictly would cast serious doubt
on the validity of trade dress registrations, particularly for product confi-
guration trade dress. The definition clearly contemplates affixation of
something separate from the goods.
Nevertheless, at least with respect to goods, strict reading of the sta-
tute could plausibly lead to the conclusion that a defendant can infringe
another's trademark rights only by affixing the other's mark to its goods
or related materials. This interpretation of "use in commerce" with re-
spect to goods would suggest that "trademark use" is to be determined
formally in terms of the physical manner of the defendant's application.94
But this is not the sense of trademark use pressed by most advo-
cates of the doctrine, likely because such a reading of section 45 is in-
compatible with other parts of the infringement provisions. For one
91. Id.
92. When Congress amended section 45 in 1988, it added the preamble language "'use in com-
merce' means the bona fide use of a mark in the ordinary course of trade, and not made merely to re-
serve a right in a mark." Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-667, § 134, 102 Stat.
3935, 3948 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006)); see also S. REP. No. 100-515, at 5-6
(1988). It made this change at the same time it revised other provisions in the statute to provide for
applications to register marks based on good faith intent to use and to make clear that marks could not
be registered on the basis of "token use." 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 21, § 17:21. This is at least cir-
cumstantial evidence that Congress understood the use in commerce definition in section 45 to relate
to the use necessary to gain ownership rights in marks.
93. See Dogan & Lemley, The Merchandising Right, supra note 31, at 500-01; cf. Dinwoodie &
Janis, supra note 5. at 1614-15 (noting that "the fact that a term is affixed to a product does not in any
way guarantee that the term is used as a mark" because the focus of contemporary trademark law is on
consumer association rather than formal notions such as affixation).
94. This reading is not inevitable, even if one believes the definition is intended to apply to uses
by the defendant. The definition identifies uses that shall be deemed uses in commerce, but it is not
clearly an exhaustive list. While the definition provides examples of actions that a court would have to
find satisfies the "use in commerce" requirement, nothing in the text forbids a court from recognizing
other uses in commerce. -
95. Reading the "use in commerce" definition as a comprehensive one would also radically alter
the scope of false advertising claims under section 43(a). Section 43(a)(1) specifically limits applica-
tion of both the unfair competition subsection ((a)(1)(A)) and the false advertising subsection
((a)(1)(B)) to uses in commerce of "any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination the-
reof, or any false designation of origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false or misleading
representation of fact." Lanham Act § 43(a)(1). If a "use in commerce" means a trademark use as
defined in section 45. only trademark uses that "misrepresent[] the nature, characteristics, qualities, or
geographic origin of [the party] or another person's goods, services, or commercial activities" are ac-
tionable as false advertising. Id. § 43(a)(1)(B). But clearly a much broader range of statements are
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thing, it would be odd for "use in commerce" to require affixation-by
definition use on a good-when section 32 defines infringing use to in-
clude uses both on and in connection with goods or services.96
Additionally, because the definition of use in commerce with re-
spect to goods does not include use in advertising, reading the statute
strictly would lead to the conclusion that use of a mark to advertise
goods could not infringe a mark owner's rights. Yet section 32 explicitly
makes advertising uses actionable, 97 and courts have imposed liability for
uses in advertising under both section 329' and section 43(a)(1)(A), 9
which does not specifically refer to use in advertising in its definition of
infringement. Indeed, as Barrett recognized, several courts found use in
advertising actionable even under the 1905 Act, which explicitly required
affixation as an element of infringement."°
Defining infringing "use in commerce" to require affixation of the
plaintiff's mark would also rule out actions for reverse passing off under
the Lanham Act. In a reverse passing off case the defendant sells anoth-
er's product as though it were the defendant's own-for example, by
pouring Coca-Cola into bottles labeled "New Soda" and selling the Co-
actionable as false advertising. See, e.g., Time Warner Cable, Inc. v. DIRECTV, Inc., 497 F.3d 144,
150 (2d Cir. 2007) (finding literally false defendant's claim that customers would not get "the best pic-
ture out of some fancy big screen" without satellite service and that settling for cable was "illogical");
Castrol Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 987 F.2d 939, 941 (3d Cir. 1993) (finding literally false and actionable de-
fendant's product superiority claims, including its claim that Pennzoil motor oil "outperforms any
leading motor oil against viscosity breakdown"); Coca-Cola Co. v. Tropicana Prods., Inc., 690 F.2d
312, 318 (2d Cir. 1982) (finding defendant's television orange juice commercial false on its face when
the visual component made an explicit representation that its orange juice was produced by squeezing
oranges and pouring freshly squeezed juice directly into a carton and the simultaneous audio compo-
nent stated that its juice was "pasteurized juice as it comes from the orange").
96. Lanham Act § 32(1)(a) (imposing liability on a party who, without the registrant's consent,
"use[s] in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of a registered mark in
connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of any goods or services on or in
connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive" (em-
phasis added)).
97. Id. (defining infringement as "use in commerce" of a trademark "in connection with the sale,
offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of any goods or services" (emphasis added)).
98. See, e.g., Gen. Conference Corp. of Seventh-Day Adventists v. Perez, 97 F. Supp. 2d 1154
(S.D. Fla. 2000) (national religious organization's "Seventh-Day Adventist" and "SDA" marks in-
fringed by the defendant's use of the marks in church name, church publications, radio broadcasts, and
newspaper advertising); Entm't & Sports Programming Network, Inc. v. Edinburg Cmty. Hotel, Inc.,
735 F. Supp. 1334 (S.D. Tex. 1986) (receiving subscription television programming from a satellite dish
antenna without authorization infringed trade name and trademark "HBO" and "Home Box Office"
by distributing the trademark owner's programming to hotel patrons and by advertising the owner's
service in the defendant's hotel); U.S. Plywood Corp. v. Zeesman Plywood Corp., 92 F. Supp. 336
(S.D. Cal. 1950) (selling and advertising of grooved plywood under the defendant's trademark "Vene-
tex" infringed plaintiff's "Weldtex" trademark).
99. See, e.g., Weight Watchers Int'l, Inc. v. Stouffer Corp., 744 F. Supp. 1259 (S.D.N.Y. 1990)
(using the plaintiff's mark in the defendant's advertising that claimed the defendant's foods could be
used in the plaintiff's diet program infringed the plaintiff's rights under section 32); Wendy's Int'l, Inc.,
v. Big Bite, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 816 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (finding the defendant's imitation of the plaintiff's
marks in a purported parody of a fast food restaurant's advertisement infringed the plaintiff's rights
under section 43(a)).
100. See, e.g., Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. Panther-Panco Rubber Co., 153 F.2d
662, 666-67 (1st Cir. 1946) (holding that use in advertising met the statutory affixation requirement).
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ca-Cola as though it were "New Soda." ' In these cases, the defendant
falsely designates the source of the goods it sells without ever using the
plaintiff's mark in any formal sense. If use in commerce requires affixa-
tion, this type of false designation cannot be actionable. Yet courts have
long held that reverse passing off violates section 43(a) of the Lanham
Act,"° a position explicitly accepted by the Supreme Court in Dastar
Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp."3
Finally, a formalist approach to trademark use is not even possible
with respect to services because the statutory definition of "use in com-
merce" with respect to services is fatally flawed. According to section 45,
a mark is used in commerce on services when it is "used or displayed in
the sale or advertising of services."'"
Perhaps recognizing these difficulties with the formalist approach,
Dogan and Lemley admit that the "use in commerce" requirement
"plays primarily a jurisdictional role in trademark cases" and advocate a
more fluid approach to the use in commerce language in the infringe-
101. Reverse passing off should be contrasted with forward passing off (generally referred to
simply as passing off), in which party B sells its own product as though it emanated from A. If, for
example, I brewed my own soda and filled Coca-Cola bottles with it and then sold the drink as Coca-
Cola, I would be passing off my soda as Coca-Cola.
102. See Smith v. Montoro, 648 F.2d 602, 606 (9th Cir. 1981) (recognizing claim of reverse passing
off as "analogous to those of other complaints which have been held to state a cause of action under
section 43(a)"); Truck Equip. Serv. Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., 536 F.2d 1210, 1216 (8th Cir. 1976) (finding
a violation of section 43(a) when a farm equipment manufacturer used photographs of a competitor's
grain trailer labeled as a product of the defendant in the defendant's sales literature, and noting that
"the use of another's product, misbranded to appear as that of a competitor [i.e., reverse passing off],
has been repeatedly found to be 'a false designation of origin' actionable under [section] 43(a)"); John
Wright, Inc. v. Casper Corp., 419 F. Supp. 292, 325 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (noting that section 43(a) "prohi-
bits 'reverse palming off,' i.e., conduct whereby the defendant purchases or otherwise obtains the
plaintiff's goods, removes plaintiff's name and replaces it with his own"), affd in relevant part sub
noma. Donsco, Inc. v. Casper Corp., 587 F.2d 602 (3d Cir. 1978); FRA S.p.A. v. Surg-O-Flex of Am.,
Inc., 415 F. Supp. 421, 423-24 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (reaffirming previous grant of a preliminary injunction
based on allegations that a bandage manufacturer's former distributor violated section 43(a) by con-
tinuing to sell boxes of the manufacturer's bandages, after termination of the distributorship, by past-
ing the distributor's trademark over the manufacturer's name); Matsushita Elec. Corp. of Am. v. Solar
Sound Sys., Inc., 381 F. Supp. 64, 66-67, 70 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (finding a "clear violation" of sec-
tion 43(a) based on the defendant's conduct in slightly modifying the control panel on the plaintiff's
radio, removing the plaintiff's nameplate to substitute the defendant's, and scraping off the embossed
labeling on the back).
103. 539 U.S. 23, 30 (2003) ("The Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988 made clear that [sec-
tion] 43(a) covers origin of production as well as geographic origin. Its language is amply inclusive,
moreover, of reverse passing off .. " (footnote omitted)). It is no answer to suggest, as Barrett does
in a new paper, that this difficulty is avoided simply by classifying reverse passing off as a claim for
"deceptive marketing," as the Restatement apparently does. See Margreth Barrett, Finding Trade-
mark Use: The Historical Foundation for Limiting Infringement Liability to Uses "in the Manner of a
Mark," 43 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 893, 931 n.137 (2008). However one characterizes reverse passing
off, the Supreme Court has held it is actionable under section 43(a) despite the fact that reverse pass-
ing off entails no use of the plaintiff's mark at all. In other words, the Court found no trademark use
requirement in section 43(a), at least for what Barrett calls "deceptive marketing" claims. Even if one
could find a robust trademark use requirement elsewhere, it surely would not take plaintiffs long simp-
ly to begin filing their claims against search engines as section 43(a) deceptive marketing claims if that
allowed them to avoid the trademark use requirement. I doubt the retitled claims would be any less
vexing for Google.
104. Lanham Act § 45, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006) (emphasis added).
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ment context, making the strict definition inapplicable to infringement. 5
Even Google, a primary advocate of the trademark use doctrine, does
not press the argument that trademark uses require affixation. In its
brief in Rescuecom Corp. v. Google, Inc., for example, Google concedes
that trademark use is possible without "visual branding" and offers two
hypothetical "trademark uses" that involve no affixation."°  "When a
waitress tells you that the syrupy brown beverage in your glass is Coca-
Cola, that's trademark use. So too would CBS be in hot water if it
started using the three-note NBC chime in its promotions."1" These uses
would qualify as "trademark uses" despite their lack of affixation,
Google concedes, because they denote the source of the relevant prod-
uct.
10 8
Thus, even for the most ardent trademark use supporters, "trade-
mark use" must be defined functionally; a trademark use is a use that in-
dicates the source or origin of one's goods or services." 9 Rather than fo-
cusing on the nature of the designation used and the manner of its use,
this definition of trademark use focuses on the meaning conveyed by that
use.
The trouble with this functional view of the trademark use require-
ment is that it is difficult to find in the text of the Lanham Act as an ex-
plicit element of infringement. Neither section 32 nor section 43(a) men-
tions "trademark use" or "use as a designation of source" in its definition
of infringement.' In fact, the lack of an explicit trademark use require-
ment in the infringement provisions, together with the exemptions from
liability of particular non-trademark uses in section 33(b)(4),"' conclu-
sively demonstrates to Dinwoodie and Janis that no general trademark
use requirement exists.' 2 By identifying particular non-trademark uses
105. Dogan & Lemley,supra note 1, at 1675-76.
106. Google Brief, supra note 2. at 11-12.
107. Id.
108. Id.; see Rescuecom Corp. v. Google, Inc., 456 F. Supp. 2d 393, 400 (N.D.N.Y. 2006) ("A
'trademark use'.., is one indicating source or origin." (quoting Pirone v. MacMillan, Inc., 894 F.2d
579, 583 (2d Cir. 1990))).
109. Trademark use advocates have not sworn off the manner of use altogether, however. For
example, while Dogan and Lemley concede that section 45 needs to be interpreted somewhat more
flexibly in terms of infringement, they maintain that the defendant must somehow present the plain-
tiffs mark to consumers, and they emphasize that the defendant's use must be as a mark for its own
products or services. See Dogan & Lemley, supra note 1, at 1677.
110. The two sections differ to some extent in the language of likelihood of confusion: section 32
refers simply to uses in commerce that are likely to "cause confusion, mistake, or to deceive," Lanham
Act § 32(1)(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a) (2006), while section 43(a) refers more specifically to use "likely
to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation, connection or association of
such person with another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, ser-
vices, or commercial activities," id. § 43(a)(1)(A).
111. See id. § 33(b)(4) (making a defense to trademark infringement "the use of the name, term,
or device charged to be an infringement is a use, otherwise than as a mark, of the party's individual
name in his own business, or of the individual name of anyone in privity with such party, or of a term
or device which is descriptive of and used fairly and in good faith only to describe the goods or services
of such party, or their geographic origin").
112. Dinwoodie & Janis, supra note 5, at 1617.
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as fair uses, they argue, Congress implicitly rejected a categorical exemp-
tion for non-trademark use.113 Indeed, reading a general trademark use
requirement into the infringement provisions would render the fair use
provision superfluous, and as Dinwoodie and Janis note, "Ordinary ca-
nons of statutory construction counsel against such a reading... 4
At first glance, this statutory construction seems compelling. It is
difficult to tease a trademark use requirement out of the "use in com-
merce" language of the statute, and the descriptive fair use defense does
seem unnecessary if the statute generally imposes liability only when a
defendant makes a trademark use. But close examination reveals that
the infringement provisions do require "trademark use" in order to trig-
ger liability. This requirement derives not from the definition of "use in
commerce" but from the fact that liability attaches only for uses that
cause a particular type of confusion-source confusion. Because the only
uses that can cause source confusion are uses that in some way indicate
source, the infringement provisions implicitly require trademark use in
the functional sense. 5
Unfortunately, this implicit trademark use requirement cannot
serve the limiting function proponents desire because the question of
whether a particular use denotes source can be determined only by ref-
erence to consumer understanding.
A. Infringement Requires Confusion as to Source
Under the Lanham Act, one infringes a registered trademark when
she
use[s] in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colora-
ble imitation of [the] registered mark in connection with the sale,
offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of any goods or services
on or in connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion,
or to cause mistake, or to deceive."6
And while the statute does not say so explicitly, it is abundantly clear
that the only confusion that is actionable under this provision is confu-
sion as to source."7 This point needs some further elaboration, however,
113. Id. at 1609 n.48. The recently enacted Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006 has a simi-
lar exemption for fair uses, though it too requires that the defendant use the famous mark "other than
as a designation of source." See Lanham Act § 43(c)(3)(A) (exempting "[a]ny fair use, including a
nominative or descriptive fair use, or facilitation of such fair use, of a famous mark by another person
other than as a designation of source for the person's own goods or services").
114. Dinwoodie & Janis, supra note 5, at 1617.
115. This reading does render section 33(b)(4) inescapably superfluous, but as I describe below,
superfluity hardly distinguishes the descriptive fair use defense.
116. Lanham Act § 32(1)(a).
117. Section 43(a) does explicitly say so-it defines infringing uses as those "likely to cause confu-
sion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or association ... or as to the
origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial activities." Id.
§ 43(a)(1)(A).
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because "source" in modern trademark law is an exceedingly broad and
somewhat elusive concept.
1. Source in the Modern Lanham Act
The claim that the Lanham Act makes actionable only confusion as
to source may sound strange since a number of courts and commentators
have suggested that the current Lanham Act targets confusion more gen-
erally."8 They reach this conclusion by focusing on the 1962 amendments
to section 32 of the statute. As originally drafted, section 32 made ac-
tionable uses of a mark that were "likely to cause confusion or mistake
or to deceive purchasers as to the source of origin of... goods.""' 9 Con-
gress in 1962 deleted the second half of the clause, leaving the current
statutory language targeting uses "likely to cause confusion, or to cause
mistake, or to deceive.'
' 20
The extent to which Congress meant to expand the scope of in-
fringement by this amendment is the subject of some debate' 12' but not a
particularly important one here. Whether or not Congress intended to
sweep a wider range of conduct into the statutory scheme, courts clearly
have given the current language broad construction. 2 2 The important
question here is whether Congress's decision to delete the language re-
quiring confusion as to "source of origin" opened the Lanham Act to
claims regarding confusion of any type, or if the provision remains li-
mited to source confusion.
Those who suggest that the amendment broadened the Lanham Act
to cover confusion of any type fail to consider the jurisprudential context
in which Congress amended the statute. As noted above, at the time of
the amendment, courts had already been recognizing a wider range of
potential relationships as relevant "source" relationships. Congress's
goal in amending the statute was to broaden the scope of the infringe-
ment provision to codify these results. It did not intend to cover confu-
sion in any form. The statute continues to target source confusion, but
"source confusion" can now take the form of confusion as to the actual
origin of a product or as to the mark owner's sponsorship of or affiliation
118. See, e.g., Syntex Labs., Inc. v. Norwich Pharmacal Co., 437 F.2d 566, 568-69 (2d Cir. 1971);
Dinwoodie & Janis, supra note 5, at 1654.
119. See Lanham Trade-Mark Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-459, § 32(1)(a), 60 Stat. 427,437.
120. Lanham Act § 32(1)(a).
121. See Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Trademark Monopolies, 48 EMORY L.J. 367, 470-75 (1999) (analyz-
ing the amendment and arguing that, while Congress meant to expand the scope of actionable confu-
sion beyond actual purchasers to potential purchasers, it did not intend deletion of "as to the source or
origin of goods" to be considered a substantive change); Sara Stadler Nelson, The Wages of Ubiquity
in Trademark Law, 88 IOWA L. REV. 731,800-01 (2003).
122. See Kos Pharms., Inc. v. Andrx Corp., 369 F.3d 700, 711 (3d Cir. 2004); Checkpoint Sys., Inc.
v. Check Point Software Techs., Inc., 269 F.3d 270, 295 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing deletion of the phrase
"purchasers as to the source of origin of such goods or services" from the end of the former definition
as evidence that the Lanham Act condemns confusion beyond the traditional source-of-origin confu-
sion); Syntex Labs., 437 F.2d at 568.
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with that use. All of these relationships are, in modern terms, "source"
relationships.
In fact, reading section 32 as making actionable any form of confu-
sion would lead to the striking conclusion that the Lanham Act grants
significantly broader rights to registered marks than it does to unregis-
tered marks under section 43(a). The latter specifically defines infringing
uses (of unregistered marks) as those "likely to cause confusion, or to
cause mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or associa-
tion of such person with another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship,
or approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial activities by
another person.' ' 2 3 If the language focusing on specific relationships-
sponsorship or affiliation relationships -is to be seen as a restriction on
the scope of infringement that is particular to unregistered marks, no
court has read it that way; indeed, courts repeatedly make clear that pro-
tection for registered and unregistered marks is, for the most part, iden-
tical.
124
An example may help drive home the point. Imagine that PepsiCo
started a new advertising campaign claiming that Pepsi is "preferred over
Gatorade by cyclists and runners." Further assume that consumers see-
ing this ad are confused about whether Pepsi is in fact preferred over Ga-
torade by cyclists and runners. Would the makers of Gatorade have a
claim for trademark infringement? Of course not. The advertisement
does not infringe Gatorade's trademark rights despite causing confusion
because it does not cause the right type of confusion-confusion as to
source.
125
2. Only Source-Designating Uses Can Cause Source Confusion
Having established that the infringement provisions of the Lanham
Act make actionable only source confusion-understood in the modern
123. See Lanham Act § 43(a)(1)(A); see also Dinwoodie & Janis, supra note 5, at 1653-54 (ar-
guing that the broader interpretation of the 1962 amendments as having obviated the need to show
confusion as to source of origin was affirmed legislatively by the 1988 revisions to section 43(a)).
124. See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763,776, 768 (1992) (noting that "[slection
43(a) 'prohibits a broader range of practices than does [section] 32,' which applies to registered marks,
but it is common ground that [section] 43(a) protects qualifying unregistered trademarks and that the
general principles qualifying a mark for registration under [section] 2 of the Lanham Act are for the
most part applicable in determining whether an unregistered mark is entitled to protection under [sec-
tion] 43(a)" (citation omitted)); id. at 776 (Stevens, J., concurring) (characterizing the majority opinion
interpreting section 43(a) "as having created a federal cause of action for infringement of an unregis-
tered trademark or trade dress and conclud[ing] that such a mark or dress should receive essentially
the same protection as those that are registered"); ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ'g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 921
(6th Cir. 2003) ("Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act provides a federal cause of action for infringement
of an unregistered trademark which affords such marks essentially the same protection as those that
are registered."); Rosco, Inc. v. Mirror Lite Co., 304 F.3d 1373, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2002) ("Unregistered
marks receive essentially the same protection as registered marks ....").
125. If the claim was unfounded, of course, it might constitute false advertising under sec-
tion 43(a). Lanham Act § 43(a)(1)(B). That liability turns on the falsity of the claim, however, and
not consumer confusion.
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sense to include confusion as to sponsorship or affiliation-the central
question becomes clear: what types of uses of a trademark have the ca-
pacity to cause confusion about the source of a product or service? The
question almost answers itself; it is difficult to imagine how any use of a
mark that does not indicate source could confuse consumers about
source. What would cause the confusion, if not a source indication?
If the only uses of a mark that can cause confusion about source are
uses that themselves denote source, then by definition the infringement
provisions apply only to uses that designate source. Obviously these uses
must indicate the source of something other than the plaintiff's products
or services, otherwise they would only reinforce the mark's primary asso-
ciation and would not cause confusion.'26 Implicitly, then, the defen-
dant's use must indicate the source of its own goods or services in order
to be actionable. Uses of a term in a non-source-indicative manner,
though they may cause confusion of some type, cannot cause confusion
that is actionable under the Lanham Act.
127
McCarthy therefore has it almost right when he suggests that "a
non-trademark use is highly unlikely to cause actionable confusion.'
128
McCarthy's characterization is only almost right, however, because he ac-
tually understates the point. A non-trademark use-one that does not
indicate source, sponsorship, or affiliation-is not merely unlikely to
cause confusion; it is conceptually incapable of causing the type of confu-
sion that is actionable under the Lanham Act.
129
3. Dinwoodie and Janis's Arguments
In their effort to cast doubt on the trademark use advocates' de-
scriptive claims, Dinwoodie and Janis argue that a general trademark use
requirement "runs counter to a number of instances where third-party
uses other than as a mark have been found to be potentially actionable
because they cause confusion and disrupt consumer understanding."'30
They note specifically that a defendant's use of a rival's mark as part of
its corporate name-for example, a new company unrelated to the owner
of the Nike mark for sneakers adopting the name "Nike Sneakers Inc."-
would clearly give rise to liability.' Likewise, Dinwoodie and Janis
126. For this reason Dogan and Lemley's emphasis on whether a defendant uses the plaintiff's
mark to designate the source of its own products or services does not aid the inquiry. See Dogan &
Lemley, supra note 1, at 1677-79.
127. See, e.g., Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189,197-98 (1985).
128. 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 21, § 23:11.50.
129. Google similarly mischaracterizes the issue when it claims in its brief that "people are often
confused, but only confusion caused by trademark use is actionable." Google Brief, supra note 2, at 6.
More accurately, not all confusion is relevant; only confusion about source is actionable. And since
only use of a source designator can cause confusion as to source, infringement necessarily entails use
that designates source.
130. Dinwoodie & Janis, supra note 5, at 1625.
131. Id. at 1627.
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claim, a party's use of a competitor's mark as part of a narrative sentence
on the packaging of its goods or on the goods themselves-such as the
fictional Zazu's statement that "ZAZU sneakers are much cheaper and
more comfortable than NIKE sneakers"-would be protected from lia-
bility only if done in good faith, even though such a use would not likely
be treated by courts or the United States Patent and Trademark Office
as "use as a mark.,
132
These arguments are unavailing, however, because they treat the
reference to a "trademark" too formally. As discussed at length above,
the sense in which the Lanham Act requires "trademark use" is the func-
tional sense; "trademark use" is use that denotes the source of the de-
fendant's products or services. In this sense, "trademark use" includes
uses of a trade name, service mark, or any other formal designation, so
long as that designation indicates source. The technical distinction be-
tween trademarks and trade names is not important here, just as it gen-
erally is not in modern trademark law. Thus, a party's use of "Nike" in
its corporate name would be trademark use in this functional sense, even
if formally it would be considered use as a trade name, as long the use
indicated source. Likewise, Dinwoodie and Janis's fictional Zazu com-
pany would be liable for using its competitor's mark in a narrative sen-
tence when such use was likely to cause confusion. If the use was likely
to cause confusion, it could only be because Zazu's use indicated
source.
133
Also unavailing is Dinwoodie and Janis's broader contention that
trademark use is insufficient to determine liability under the Lanham Act
because "the types of use necessary to establish consumer understanding
are plausibly different from those uses that might interfere with extant
consumer understanding and, thus, increase search costs."1" Conceptual-
ly, Dinwoodie and Janis are correct that the use requirement in the ac-
quisition context need not be symmetrical with the requirement in the
infringement context. But they abstract away from the actual language
of the statute when they suggest that this conceptual possibility has doc-
trinal significance. The fact that non-trademark uses can unsettle con-
sumer understanding is not evidence that the statute makes all such uses
132. Id. at 1627-28 & n.138. It is true that this type of use would not likely be treated as a suffi-
cient use to demonstrate use for purposes of registration, but that focuses too much on the technical
requirements of registration. This affixation requirement is a proxy for consumer understanding, but
consumer understanding controls. If a party could show that this type of use on packaging was in fact
viewed by consumers as a source indication, that party could prevail in an infringement suit even with-
out a registration.
133. Dinwoodie and Janis acknowledge in a footnote that some uses of another's mark in a narra-
tive sentence, such as Zazu's use of Nike in fifty-four point bright red type, might be considered
trademark uses. Id. at 1628 n.139. Dinwoodie and Janis claim, however, that such a conclusion merely
substantiates their central claim that the character of the defendant's use is "ultimately a function of
context." Id. To the extent Dinwoodie and Janis seek merely to demonstrate that trademark use-
understood formally-cannot resolve all cases, I agree. But if these examples are meant to disprove
the existence of a trademark use requirement, Dinwoodie and Janis go too far.
134. Id. at 1626 (footnote omitted).
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actionable. Instead it simply demonstrates the weakness of the search
costs theory as a general descriptive account of trademark doctrine.
Finally, Dinwoodie and Janis argue that reading the "'use as a
mark' requirement strictly as incorporating the notion of the mark as a
'source-identifier[]' . . . might undermine the multi-billion dollar industry
of brand merchandising and product design" and that the debate about
merchandising "should occur through a candid debate about the social
value of validating Veblen goods and not collaterally through a back-
door interpretation of a newly discovered doctrine of trademark law."' 35
But imposing a requirement of source identification, as the Lanham Act
does, only undermines brand merchandising if the marks or logos being
used in those contexts do not, in fact, indicate to consumers anything
about the source of the products on which they are used. And if the
marks do not indicate source in those contexts, then the question of mer-
chandising is not merely one about the social value of Veblen goods; it is
fundamentally about the legitimacy of modern trademark law and the
"source-identification" it seeks to protect.
4. The Descriptive Fair Use Defense
If, as I argue above, only uses of a mark that denote the source of a
defendant's products or services can constitute trademark infringement,
what purpose is served by the statutory fair use defense? As Dinwoodie
and Janis note, that defense is superfluous if non-trademark uses gener-
ally do not fall within the ambit of the infringement provisions.
According to section 33(b)(4), it is a defense to trademark in-
fringement that
the use of the name, term, or device charged to be an infringement
is a use, otherwise than as a mark, of the party's individual name in
his own business, or of the individual name of anyone in privity with
such party, or of a term or device which is descriptive of and used
fairly and in good faith only to describe the goods or services of
such party, or their geographic origin.1
36
This provision does independent work in the statute only if it is possible
for a defendant to use a particular term in a way that simultaneously de-
scribes the products or services with which it is used and denotes source.
And indeed the possibility of such dual meaning was recognized regular-
ly by courts in the traditional trademark era. As the Supreme Court
135. Id. at 1654 (footnote omitted). Dinwoodie and Janis express doubt that the trademark use
advocates meant to cast doubt on merchandising though Dogan and Lemley have explicitly questioned
the validity of the merchandising right in at least some contexts. See Dogan & Lemley, The Merchan-
dising Right, supra note 31, at 464.
136. Lanham Act § 33(b)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (2006). Though by their own terms the de-
fenses listed in section 33(b) are applicable only to alleged infringement of an incontestable mark, sec-
tion 33(a) incorporates all of the defenses in section 33(b)(4), making them legitimate defenses to in-
fringement of any registered trademark. Id. § 33(a).
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noted in KP Permanent, "[T]he common law of unfair competition also
tolerated some degree of confusion from a descriptive use of words con-
tained in another person's trademark." '137 But this historical fact offers
precious little interpretative guidance with respect to the modern statute
because the normative goals of modem trademark law are so different
from those courts traditionally pursued and because section 33(b)(4) did
not exist at the time of those earlier decisions.
Trademark law traditionally focused on preventing competitors
from diverting each other's trade. Courts in this era were operating in a
natural rights tradition that called on courts to protect parties' productive
labors while at the same time leaving room for others to exercise their
like rights to labor productively. They achieved this balance by insisting
that only certain types of trade diversions were actionable-dishonest or
deceptive ones. And those courts focused on a narrow form of decep-
tion, condemning only attempts to pass off one's products as those of
another. Under traditional trademark principles, then, courts had room
to recognize that descriptiveness and source signification were not mu-
tually exclusive. Even if a defendant's use of a particular mark designat-
ed source and confused consumers, it still would not have been actiona-
ble if the defendant's use of the term was truthful.
138
The modern Lanham Act leaves no room to recognize such duality.
Under section 33(b)(4), the only uses for which a defendant may claim
fair use are uses "otherwise than as a mark." '39 The defense applies, in
other words, only to descriptive uses that do not denote the source of the
defendant's products or services or suggest another's sponsorship or affil-
iation. Such purely descriptive uses need no affirmative defense, howev-
er, because they are incapable of causing actionable confusion.
It is true, as Dinwoodie and Janis note, that this interpretation is to
some extent inconsistent with the Supreme Court's claim in KP Perma-
nent that "some possibility of consumer confusion must be compatible
with fair use.""'4 If the Court meant by that statement that some amount
of actionable confusion is compatible with the statutory fair use defense,
it misread the statute.
In reaching its conclusion, the Court noted that "[s]ection [33](b)
places a burden of proving likelihood of confusion (that is, infringement)
on the party charging infringement even when relying on an incontesta-
137. KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 119 (2004) ("[Als
to plaintiff's trademark claim, '[tihe use of a similar name by another to truthfully describe his own
product does not constitute a legal or moral wrong, even if its effect be to cause the public to mistake
the origin or ownership of the product[.].' (quoting William R. Warner & Co. v. Eli Lily & Co., 265
U.S. 526, 528 (1924))): Canal Co. v. Clark, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 311, 327 (1871) ("Purchasers may be mis-
taken, but they are not deceived by false representations, and equity will not enjoin against telling the
truth.").
138. See William R. Warner & Co., 265 U.S. at 528 (emphasizing that the truthful use of descrip-
tive terms, even if confusing, is not actionable); Canal Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 327.
139. Lanham Act § 33(b)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (2006).
140. 543 U.S. at 121.
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ble registration" and that "Congress said nothing about likelihood of
confusion in setting out the elements of the fair use defense in [sec-
tion 331(b)(4).' 141 On the latter point-that Congress said nothing about
likelihood of confusion in section 33(b)(4)-the Court rejected the plain-
tiff's contention that Congress intended the "used fairly" language as a
requirement that the defendant's use not cause confusion.
1 4
1
This interpretation is reasonable, as far as it goes. But the Court's
reasoning was incomplete because it ignored the statutory requirement
that the claimed fair use be "otherwise than as a mark.' ' 43  In my view
that language clearly limits the availability of the fair use defense to uses
that do not indicate source. Yet uses that do not indicate source can
never infringe because they cannot cause actionable confusion. t" Con-
sequently, while some amount of confusion may be compatible with fair
use, no amount of actionable confusion is compatible with the statutory
fair use provision.
Inasmuch as a finding that the defendant's use indicates the source
of its products or services is a necessary part of the likelihood of confu-
sion determination, it is no surprise that courts have had difficulty de-
termining fair use without considering likelihood of confusion. The Su-
preme Court itself recognized in KP Permanent that likelihood of
confusion will play some role in a determination of fair use,' 45 and on re-
mand the Ninth Circuit held that the degree of customer confusion re-
mains a factor in determining fair use.46 Significantly, as long as courts
consider likelihood of confusion in determining fair use, early resolution
141. Id. at 118.
142. The Solicitor General argued in KP Permanent that the "used fairly" requirement in sec-
tion 33(b)(4) requires "only that the descriptive term describe the [defendant's] goods accurately." Id.
at 123. Though the Court ultimately did not determine what the "used fairly" language means, it gave
some implicit support to the Solicitor General's interpretation by rejecting the plaintiff's contention
that "used fairly" imported an absence of confusion. Id. at 120-21.
143. See Lanham Act § 33(b)(4).
144. See supra Part III.A.2.
145. 543 U.S. at 123 ("It suffices to realize that our holding that fair use can occur along with
some degree of confusion does not foreclose the relevance of the extent of any likely consumer confu-
sion in assessing whether a defendant's use is objectively fair. Two Courts of Appeals have found it
relevant to consider such scope, and commentators and amici here have urged us to say that the de-
gree of likely consumer confusion bears not only on the fairness of using a term, but even on the fur-
ther question whether an originally descriptive term has become so identified as a mark that a defen-
dant's use of it cannot realistically be called descriptive."); Shakespeare Co. v. Silstar Corp. of Am..
Inc., 110 F.3d 234, 243 (4th Cir. 1997) ("[71o the degree that confusion is likely, a use is less likely to be
found fair .... "); Sunmark, Inc. v. Ocean Spray Cranberries, Inc., 64 F.3d 1055, 1059 (7th Cir. 1995).
146. KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 408 F.3d 596, 609 (9th Cir. 2005).
Thus, having found a question of fact on likelihood of confusion that precluded summary judgment for
the defendant, the court found that summary judgment on the fair use defense also was inappropriate.
Id. ("Among the relevant factors for consideration by the jury in determining the fairness of the use
are the degree of likely confusion, the strength of the trademark, the descriptive nature of the term for
the product or service being offered by [the defendant] and the availability of alternative descriptive
terms, the extent of the use of the term prior to the registration of the trademark, and any differences
among the times and contexts in which [the defendant] has used the term.").
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is extremely unlikely since likelihood of confusion is a fact-intensive de-
termination.147
5. Superfluity of Other Defenses
The observation that the statutory fair use defense is superfluous
because it applies only to uses "otherwise than as a mark"'48 has broader
implications because it calls into question a number of other trademark
doctrines commonly considered defenses.
a. Nominative Fair Use
The nominative fair use doctrine is frequently characterized as a de-
fense to infringement even though courts often include in the nominative
fair use test some type of confusion factor.'49 As it was articulated in
New Kids on the Block v. News America Publishing, Inc.,5° the nomina-
tive fair use doctrine applies "where the defendant uses a trademark to
describe the plaintiff's product, rather than its own," and (1) "the prod-
uct or service in question [is] one not readily identifiable without use of
the trademark"; (2) the defendant uses "only so much of the mark or
marks as is reasonably necessary to identify the product or service"; and
(3) the defendant does "nothing that would, in conjunction with the
mark, suggest sponsorship or endorsement by the trademark holder."'51
Nominative fair use might reasonably be considered a defense with
independent significance if we place heavy emphasis on part (3) of the
New Kids test, and particularly its focus on a defendant's actions "in con-
junction with the mark.' 51 2 Specifically, the defense would not be super-
fluous if courts interpreted the third factor to mean that, where the first
147. See, e.g., Clicks Billiards Inc. v. Sixshooters, Inc., 251 F.3d 1252, 1265 (9th Cir. 2001) ("[Tlrial
courts disfavor deciding trademark cases in summary judgments because the ultimate issue is so inhe-
rently factual .... [T]he question of likelihood of confusion is routinely submitted for jury determina-
tion ...." (quoting Levi Strauss & Co. v. Blue Bell, Inc., 778 F.2d 1352, 1355 n.5 (9th Cir. 1985))); An-
heuser-Busch, Inc. v. L & L Wings, Inc., 962 F.2d 316, 318 (4th Cir. 1992) ("Likelihood of
confusion ... has long been recognized to be 'a matter of varying human reactions to situations incap-
able of exact appraisement."' (quoting Colburn v. Puritan Mills, Inc., 108 F.2d 377, 378 (7th Cir.
1939))); Warner Bros. Inc. v. Am. Broad. Cos., 720 F.2d 231, 246 (2d Cir. 1983) ("[L]ikelihood of con-
fusion is frequently a fairly disputed issue of fact on which reasonable minds may differ . .
148. Lanham Act § 33(b)(4).
149. The nominative fair use defense is not clearly grounded in the Lanham Act, at least with re-
spect to infringement claims, and there is therefore no statutory construction question here. The
Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006 does refer to the defense explicitly, though it is somewhat
unclear how the defense applies to dilution claims. See id. § 43(c)(3).
150. 971 F.2d 302 (9th Cir. 1992).
151. Id. at 308. Even this decision is a bit of a puzzle, however. Judge Kozinski writes that
"[b]ecause [this type of use] does not implicate the source-identification function that is the purpose of
trademark, it does not constitute unfair competition; such use is fair because it does not imply sponsor-
ship or endorsement by the trademark holder." Id. If it were true that such uses did not imply spon-
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two conditions are met, the defendant's use is fair even if its use of the
mark causes confusion, as long as the defendant does nothing else in ad-
dition to using the mark. Stated differently, if a defendant meets the first
two requirements, confusion caused by the defendant's mere use of the
mark itself must be tolerated. On this understanding, nominative fair use
is distinguishable from the statutory fair use provision in that it allows for
the possibility that a confusing use might nevertheless be considered
fair.
53
But this is not the way all courts-and not even all decisions in the
Ninth Circuit-have understood nominative fair use.'54  In Brother
Records, Inc. v. Jardine,'55 for example, the court rejected former Beach
Boy Al Jardine's claim that his use of the "Beach Boys" mark to pro-
mote his new band was nominative fair use.'56 The court rejected Jar-
dine's claim because his "use of the trademark suggested sponsorship or
endorsement by the [owner of the Beach Boys mark]."'57 Indeed, the
court in Jardine characterized the third requirement of the nominative
fair use defense as "merely the other side of the likelihood-of-confusion
coin" and reiterated that, in the Ninth Circuit, the nominative fair use
analysis replaces the likelihood of confusion analysis.'58 Remarkably, by
invoking the nominative fair use defense, a defendant seems to inherit
the burden of persuasion on the confusion issue: "whereas plaintiff car-
ries the burden of persuasion in a trademark infringement claim to show
likelihood of confusion, the nominative fair use defense shifts to the de-
fendant the burden of proving no likelihood of confusion.
159
153. This is not to say that nominative fair use would be predictable or clear under these condi-
tions. As Bruce Keller and Rebecca Tushnet noted, the determination of whether a defendant has
used only so much of the mark as reasonably necessary to identify the product or service is inescapably
subjective. See Bruce P. Keller & Rebecca Tushnet, Even More Parodic than the Real Thing: Parody
Lawsuits Revisited, 94 TRADEMARK REP. 979, 1006 (2004) ("Establishing a conceptual floor [for no-
minative fair use] in the form of 'no more than necessary' is too vague and manipulable and does not
give sufficient leeway to free speech interests.").
154. Indeed it is not even clear that the New Kids court understood nominative fair use this way.
In another part of its decision, the court wrote that "[blecause [the use of the mark] does not implicate
the source-identification function that is the purpose of trademark, it does not constitute unfair com-
petition; such use is fair because it does not imply sponsorship or endorsement by the trademark hold-
er." 971 F.2d at 308.
155. 318 F.3d 900 (9th Cir. 2003).
156. Jardine initially planned to perform with his band as "Beach Boys Family and Friends," and
later performed under various "Beach Boys" names, including "Al Jardine of the Beach Boys and
Family & Friends," "The Beach Boys 'Family and Friends,'" Beach Boys Family & Friends," "The
Beach Boys, Family & Friends." "Beach Boys and Family," as well as, simply, "The Beach Boys." Id.
at 902.
157. Id. at 908.
15& Id. at 908 n.5.
159. Id. Since the nominative fair use analysis replaces the traditional likelihood of confusion
analysis, it seems the plaintiff is entirely relieved of its responsibility to prove likelihood of confusion
when the defendant claims nominative fair use. Cf William McGeveran, Rethinking Trademark Fair
Use, 94 IOWA L. REV. 49, 91 (2008) ("This substitution [of nominative fair use for the traditional like-
lihood of confusion test] also shifts burdens unfairly.").
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Because it regarded nominative fair use as analogous to descriptive
fair use under section 33(b)(4), the court in Century 21 Real Estate Corp.
v. Lendingtree, Inc."6 believed the principle from KP Permanent pre-
vented it from placing on the defendant the burden of proving lack of
confusion.161 Consequently, the Third Circuit rejected the Ninth Circuit's
view that nominative fair use supplants the traditional likelihood of con-
fusion analysis. The Third Circuit then adopted a different three part
test for nominative fair use under which a use is fair if
(1) ... use of plaintiff's mark is necessary to describe both the plain-
tiff's product or service and the defendant's product or service;
(2) ... the defendant uses only so much of the plaintiff's mark as is
necessary to describe plaintiff's product; and (3) ... the defendant's
conduct or language reflect the true and accurate relationship be-
tween plaintiff and defendant's products or services.162
It is not clear that this test better preserves uses of a mark in the
face of potential confusion. First, this test may be more restrictive than
the Ninth Circuit's test in that it requires that the mark used by the de-
fendant be necessary not only to describe the plaintiff's product, but also
to describe the defendant's product or service. Second, and probably
more importantly, the third factor of this test still requires a court to de-
termine whether the defendant's use reflects the "true and accurate rela-
tionship" '63 between the plaintiff and defendant. Though disguised in
somewhat different language, this provision clearly invites courts to en-
gage in precisely the same type of analysis the Ninth Circuit demands.
Substantively, there seems little difference between asking whether
"the defendant's conduct or language reflect the true and accurate rela-
tionship between the plaintiff and defendant's products or services""
and determining whether the defendant's conduct is likely to cause con-
fusion as to sponsorship or affiliation.165 If a defendant's use reflects the
true and accurate relationship, it cannot cause confusion about the rela-
tionship between the parties. Consumers may believe that the plaintiff
and defendant are related in some way, but they will not be confused if
the parties actually are related. If, on the other hand, the defendant's use
suggests some relationship between the plaintiff and defendant when
there is none, it has caused confusion about sponsorship or affiliation.
Thus, for all its lofty rhetoric about ensuring that some nominative uses
can be deemed fair despite potential confusion, the test the Third Circuit
160. 425 F.3d 211 (3d Cir. 2005).
161. Id. at 222-23. KP Permanent was decided purely on statutory grounds, and nominative fair
use is a common law doctrine, so the holding of that case technically says nothing about the status of
nominative fair use. See KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 134
(2004).
162. Century 21, 425 F.3d at 222.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ'g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302,308 (9th Cir. 1992).
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articulated falls short of making nominative fair use distinct from the li-
kelihood of confusion analysis.
If these recent decisions reflect the proper understanding of nomin-
ative fair use, then nominative fair use, like statutory fair use, cannot ho-
nestly be called a defense. Instead, uses of a plaintiff's mark to describe
the plaintiff are simply excused to the extent they do not cause confu-
sion." Of course, if the defendant's use does not cause confusion, it can
never be infringing. The only significance of calling the defendant's use a
nominative one, then, seems to be to shift the burden of persuasion to
the defendant.
b. Comparative Advertising
Comparative advertising, which may be thought of as a type of no-
minative use, is also sometimes regarded as a defense to trademark in-
fringement claims.'67 But in most of the comparative advertising cases,
courts articulate tests that require the absence of confusion for the com-
parative use to be legitimate. Perhaps the best example is the influential
Smith v. Chanel, Inc. decision."6 In that case the court extolled the vir-
tues of competition and competitors' right to copy unpatented products,
ultimately holding that the defendant's advertisement of its imitation
perfume was not actionable.'69 Yet the court also noted that Chanel's
"reputation [was] not directly at stake. [Ta'Ron's] advertisement [made]
it clear that the product they offer[ed] [was] their own."' 70 Thus, the
court was confident that "[i]f it prove[d] to be inferior, [Ta'Ron], not
[Chanel], [would] bear the burden of consumer disapproval."'' And the
court couched the comparative advertising "right" expressly in likelihood
of confusion terms, holding that "in the absence of misrepresentation or
166. See McGeveran, supra note 159, at 91 (describing the "collapse of the requirements for no-
minative fair use into a substitute likelihood of confusion test").
167. See, e.g., Dinwoodie & Janis, supra note 5, at 1628 (describing a potential "comparative ad-
vertising defense").
168. 402 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1968).
169. Id. at 563. Chanel's claim was based on the defendant's advertisement for "The Ta'Ron Line
of Perfumes" in a trade journal directed to wholesale purchasers of perfume. Id. The advertisement
stated that "the Ta'Ron perfumes 'duplicate 100% perfect the exact scent of the world's finest and
most expensive perfumes and colognes at prices that will zoom sales to volumes you have never before
experienced!"' Id. The advertisement further "suggested that a 'Blindfold Test' be used 'on skeptical
prospects,' challenging them to detect any difference between a well known fragrance and the Ta'Ron
'duplicate.' One suggested challenge was, 'We dare you to try to detect any difference between Cha-
nel #5 ([$125.00) and Ta'Ron's 2nd Chance. $7.00."' Id. The advertisement also contained an order
form in which "each Ta'Ron fragrance was listed with the name of the well known fragrance which it
purportedly duplicated immediately beneath. Below 'Second Chance' appeared '*(Chanel #5).' The
asterisk referred to a statement at the bottom of the form reading 'Registered Trade Name of Original
Fragrance House."' Id.
170. Id. at 569.
171. Id.
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confusion as to source or sponsorship a seller in promoting his own goods
may use the trademark of another to identify the latter's goods." '72
So understood-and this understanding seems generally ac-
cepted t73-comparative advertising is not a defense to trademark in-
fringement in the true sense but merely an explanation of why confusion
may be unlikely. Consumers who understand the comparative nature of
an advertisement are unlikely to be confused by a reference to a compet-
itor in the advertisement. Since the issue of consumer confusion is em-
bedded within the test, however, comparative advertising does not
excuse otherwise infringing conduct. At best, the fact that a defendant's
infringing use was in a plausibly comparative context might influence the
scope of relief afforded to the plaintiff.
B. Trademark Use and the Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006
Several commentators have suggested that the recently enacted
Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006 (TDRA) more clearly requires
trademark use as a condition of liability." 4 Under the amended sec-
tion 43(c)(1),
[slubject to the principles of equity, the owner of a famous mark
that is distinctive, inherently or through acquired distinctiveness,
shall be entitled to an injunction against another person who, at any
time after the owner's mark has become famous, commences use of
a mark or trade name in commerce that is likely to cause dilution by
blurring or dilution by tarnishment of the famous mark, regardless
of the presence or absence of actual or likely confusion, of competi-
tion, or of actual economic injury.
175
This provision unambiguously requires the defendant to use a mark, but
the nature of the required use is less obvious. On one hand, the TDRA
always refers to a prospective plaintiff's mark as "the famous mark.
1' 76
172. Id.
173. See 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 21, § 25:52 ("[I]t is neither trademark infringement nor unfair
competition to truthfully compare competing products in advertising, and in doing so, to identify by
trademark, the competitor's goods. However, such comparative advertising will not be permitted if it
is likely to confuse buyers as to exactly what they are getting."); see also Hypertherm, Inc. v. Precision
Prods., Inc., 832 F.2d 697, 701 (1st Cir. 1987) (holding that an imitator may use in a truthful way an
originator's trademark when advertising that the imitator's product is a copy, so long as no confusion
as to the source is likely to result); Calvin Klein Cosmetics Corp. v. Lenox Labs., Inc., 815 F.2d 500,
503 (8th Cir. 1987) ("An imitator may use in a truthful way an originator's trademark when advertising
that the imitator's product is a copy so long as that use is not likely to create confusion in the consum-
er's mind as to the source of the product being sold.").
174. See Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, The Trademark Use Requirement in Dilution Cases,
24 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 101, 109-14 (2008).
175. Lanham Act § 43(c)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2006) (emphasis added). The Act defines
"dilution by blurring" as "association arising from the similarity between a mark or trade name and a
famous mark that impairs the distinctiveness of the famous mark," id. § 43(c)(2)(B), and "dilution by
tarnishment" as "association arising from the similarity between a mark or trade name and a famous
mark that harms the reputation of the famous mark," id. § 43(c)(2)(C).
176. Id. §43(c)(1).
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By defining the dilution claim as one that arises when another person
"commences use of a mark or trade name... that is likely to cause dilu-
tion of the famous mark,"'77 Congress juxtaposed the diluting mark
against the famous mark and implied that actionable dilution depends on
the presence of two marks-the plaintiff's famous mark and some other
mark used by the defendant, presumably its own mark. Hence, the
TDRA makes actionable only trademark uses.
On a textual level, this is a plausible reading of the statutory provi-
sion, and probably even the best reading. It is not, however, an inevita-
ble one. Even if the statute clearly requires that the defendant use a
second mark that might dilute the famous mark, it does not clearly re-
quire that the defendant use that other mark as a designation of the
source of its own goods or services. Indeed, at a theoretical level, there is
no particular reason to restrict tarnishment claims-which the statute
now explicitly includes-to source-indicative uses. Non-source-
indicative uses are at least as likely to reflect badly on a famous mark or
depict that mark in an unsavory light. If Congress nevertheless believed
that dilution claims should be limited to only some harmful uses, it could
have made the nature of the required use more explicit by giving the
owner of a famous mark a dilution claim when a defendant uses in com-
merce "a designation of the source of its own products or services that is
likely to cause dilution by blurring or dilution by tarnishment of the fam-
ous mark."
Ultimately, however, the question of whether the claim language it-
self limits dilution claims to trademark uses is of relatively limited signi-
ficance because section 43(c)(3)(A) of the statute clearly excludes from
liability most (if not all) non-trademark uses. 78 Phrased as an exclusion
rather than a defense, that section declares not actionable as dilution by
blurring or dilution by tarnishment "any fair use, including a nominative
or descriptive fair use ... of a famous mark by another person other than
as a designation of source for the person's own goods or services."'179
However one interprets the claim language of section 43(c)(1), this
exclusion provision clearly puts most non-trademark uses beyond the
reach of the federal statute. If the statute, properly interpreted, creates a
cause of action only against trademark uses that dilute a famous mark,
the exclusion is redundant of the claim language; it simply excludes a
subset of uses that already fall outside the scope of section 43(c)(1)."
177. Id.
178. Id. § 43(c)(3)(A).
179. Id. (emphasis added).
180. To find a trademark use limitation in the claim language, one must distinguish between the
plaintiff's famous mark and the other mark used by the defendant, and infer a requirement that the
defendant use the other mark as an indication of the source of its goods or services. The exclusion
provision, by contrast, applies only when the defendant is using the plaintiff's famous mark-in other
words, when there is no second mark. Id. (excluding "any fair use, including a nominative or descrip-
tive fair use ... of a famous mark by another person" (emphasis added)).
[Vol. 2009
TRADEMARK USE AND THE PROBLEM OF SOURCE
Alternatively, even if the claim language does not limit claims to trade-
mark uses, the exclusion provision prevents dilution claims against most,
if not all, non-trademark uses.
But this is not to say that true believers in the trademark use doc-
trine ought to be entirely indifferent about the location of the trademark
use requirement in the TDRA. For one thing, the exclusion may not rule
out claims against all non-trademark uses. The exclusion applies only to
fair uses of a mark other than as a designation of the source of one's own
products or services. 1 ' Courts could conceivably read "fair use" and
"otherwise than as a mark" as separate requirements, thereby continuing
to allow dilution claims against non-trademark uses that are not deemed
fair.182 Indeed, courts have sometimes treated the fair use language of
section 33(b)(4) as a separate requirement of descriptive fair use.183 If
fair use is a separate, additional requirement of the exclusion, only a sub-
set of non-trademark uses will be excluded under this provision-only
those non-trademark uses that qualify as fair uses."
The location of the trademark use requirement (or the exclusion of
fair non-trademark uses) also might determine the burden of proof on
trademark use. In particular, the location of the limitation might deter-
mine whether the plaintiff in a dilution case must prove that the defen-
181. Id.
182. Rather than define fair use for purposes of dilution, the statute notes that fair use includes
nominative and descriptive fair use, as well as uses to comment on, criticize, or parody the mark own-
er. Id. It remains unclear how courts will interpret the exemptions, particularly with respect to the
parody defense. In the context of infringement, parody is most frequently evaluated according to the
extent to which it causes confusion. See 6 MCCARTHY, supra note 21, § 31:153 ("Some parodies will
constitute an infringement, some will not. But the cry of 'parody!' does not magically fend off other-
wise legitimate claims of trademark infringement or dilution. There are confusing parodies and non-
confusing parodies. All they have in common is an attempt at humor through the use of someone
else's trademark. A non-infringing parody is merely amusing, not confusing."). Confusion obviously
is not relevant to a dilution claim, and it remains to be seen whether courts can adequately identify
parody without reference to confusion.
183. These courts would require that the defendant's use (1) describe the defendant's products or
services, (2) be otherwise than as a mark, and (3) be fair and in good faith. See, e.g.. EMI Catalogue
P'ship v. Hill, Holliday, Connors, Cosmopulos Inc., 228 F.3d 56, 64-68 (2d Cir. 2000) (evaluating
whether the defendant's use was descriptive separately from the issue of whether the use was in good
faith); see also Zatarains, Inc. v. Oak Grove Smokehouse, Inc., 698 F.2d 786, 796 (5th Cir. 1983) (con-
sidering probative, in evaluating a fair use claim, the defendant's lack of intent to use "fish fry" in a
trademark sense and conscious packaging so as to avoid confusion). As these decisions make clear,
however, the three factors cannot easily be disentangled. In EMI, for example, the court treated the
issue of descriptiveness in contrast to trademark use. 228 F.3d at 64-65. It considered, the "physical
nature of the use in terms of size, location, and other characteristics in comparison with the appear-
ance of other descriptive matter or other trademarks." Id. at 65 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
UNFAIR COMPETITION § 28 cmt. c (1995)). Good faith, on this account, deals with the defendant's
intent (or lack of intent) to trade on the good will of the trademark owner by creating confusion about
sponsorship or affiliation. Id. at 66. Since direct evidence of intent rarely is available, courts consider
"the overall context in which the marks appear and the totality of the factors that could cause consum-
er confusion." Id.
184. Or, to be more precise, only non-trademark uses that are fair uses would be exempted under
section 43(c)(3)(A). Uses that might also be considered non-trademark uses are exempted to the ex-
tent they qualify as news reporting or non-commercial uses under section 43(c)(3)(B) or (C). See
Lanham Act § 43(c)(3)(B)-(C).
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dant's use was a trademark use or the defendant must prove that its use
was not a trademark use. If the trademark use limitation comes only
from the exclusion, courts may be more comfortable treating non-
trademark use as a defense and forcing the defendant to prove that its
use was not a trademark use. Indeed, courts frequently have characte-
rized fair use in copyright law as a defense even though the fair use pro-
vision in the Copyright Act, like section 43(c)(3)(A), is stated as an ex-
clusion from liability.185
Only time will tell how courts will interpret the TDRA and whether
the locus of the trademark use limitation will affect its scope. But re-
gardless of how courts resolve these interpretive issues, just as with
trademark infringement, the trademark use requirement can predictably
limit the scope of dilution claims only if courts can develop objective
rules for determining when a particular use qualifies as a trademark use.
Unfortunately, as the next Part makes clear, trademark use does not lend
itself to clear rules.
IV. TRADEMARK USE AND CONSUMER UNDERSTANDING
As demonstrated above, both the infringement and dilution provi-
sions of the Lanham Act make only trademark uses actionable.'86 These
trademark use limitations are functional ones: a trademark use is one
that designates the source of a party's products or services.187 A court
confronted with a claim of trademark use therefore must determine
whether the defendant's use designates the source of the defendant's
products or services. But perspective matters here, and it is clear that a
court faced with a trademark use question must make its determination
from the perspective of consumers. More specifically, a court must de-
termine whether consumers are likely to perceive the defendant's use as
an indication of the source of its products or services.
This consumer perspective should seem obvious since consumer
understanding so widely controls in trademark law. Indeed, virtually
every distinction courts and the Trademark Office draw between protect-
able and unprotectable matter depends on consumer understanding.
To determine whether a term is a trademark or a generic term, for
example, a court must determine "[t]he primary significance of the mark
185. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006) ("Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the
fair use of a copyrighted work ... is not an infringement of copyright."); Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Mu-
sic Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 590 (1994) ("Since fair use is an affirmative defense, its proponent would have
difficulty carrying the burden of demonstrating fair use without favorable evidence about relevant
markets." (footnotes omitted)); cf. SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1260 n.3
(11th Cir. 2001) ("I believe that fair use should be considered an affirmative right under the 1976 Act,
rather than merely an affirmative defense, as it is defined in the Act as a use that is not a violation of
copyright. However, fair use is commonly referred to as an affirmative defense and, as we are bound
by Supreme Court precedent, we will apply it as such." (citations omitted)).
186. See supra Parts III.A-B.
187. See supra Part III.A.2.
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to the relevant public." t" When the term primarily signifies to the rele-
vant public the source of the claimant's products or services, the term
warrants protection. Likewise, to determine whether a descriptive term
has acquired secondary meaning and therefore merits trademark protec-
tion, a court must determine whether "the primary significance of the
term in the minds of the consuming public is not the product but the pro-
ducer."'8 9 Whether a term should be denied protection because it is pri-
marily a mere surname depends on whether the relevant purchasing pub-
lic is likely to regard the term as merely a surname."9 Similarly, the
question of whether a term should be denied protection on the ground it
is primarily geographically descriptive turns on likely perception by con-
sumers.19 The tests for both deceptiveness and deceptive misdescrip-
tiveness also imbed determinations of consumer understanding.'
92
Courts reviewing Trademark Office determinations of registrability
have long recognized that trademark use simply cannot be determined
formally. Considering whether the applicant had used the words "Living
Earth" as a trademark and therefore could claim the phrase as a trade-
mark, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals93 wrote:
188. See Lanham Act § 14(3) ("The primary significance of the registered mark to the relevant
public rather than purchaser motivation shall be the test for determining whether the registered mark
has become the generic name of goods or services on or in connection with which it has been used."
(emphasis added)).
189. Kellogg Co. v. Nat'l Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 118 (1938) (emphasis added); see also Inwood
Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 851 n.ll (1982) ("[S]econdary meaning [is acquired
when] ... in the minds of the public, the primary significance of a product feature ... is to identify the
source of the product rather than the product itself.").
190. Indeed, it does not even matter whether the party using the name actually has the name as
her surname. What matters is consumer perception. See, e.g., 815 Tonawanda St. Corp. v. Fay's Drug
Co., 842 F.2d 643, 648 (2d Cir. 1988) (requiring the plaintiff, asserting rights in the personal name Fay,
to prove secondary meaning even though there was "no one named Fay ... associated with Fay's
Leader"). Likewise, even if the mark actually is comprised of surnames, secondary meaning is not
required if consumers are not likely to view the mark as such. See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. CarMax,
Inc., 165 F.3d 1047, 1054 (6th Cir. 1999) (finding that while the CarMax mark was purportedly a com-
bination of the first names Carson and Max, the public would not perceive it to be a combination of
personal names when used as a mark to sell used cars).
191. Burke-Parsons-Bowlby Corp. v. Appalachian Log Homes, Inc., 871 F.2d 590, 594 (6th Cir.
1989) ("Where it is determined that the mark as perceived by potential purchasers describes the geo-
graphic origin of the goods the mark is primarily geographically descriptive.").
192. A claimed mark is deceptively misdescriptive, and therefore denied registration, when (1)
"the mark misdescribe[s] the goods or services" with which the mark is used; and (2) "consumers [are]
likely to believe the misrepresentation." In re Phillips-Van Heusen Corp., 2002 WL 523343, at *1048
(T.T.A.B. Mar. 28, 2002). A mark is adjudged deceptive, and therefore denied registration, when: (1)
"the term [is] misdescriptive of the character, quality, function, composition or use of the goods [or
services]"; (2) "prospective purchasers [are] likely to believe that the misdescription actually describes
the goods or [services]"; and (3) "the misdescription [is] likely to affect [consumers'] decisions to pur-
chase." Id. (quoting In re Budge Mfg. Co., 857 F.2d 773, 775 (Fed. Cir. 1988)).
193. The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals was a precursor to the Federal Circuit and heard
appeals of registration decisions. That court was abolished by the 1982 Federal Courts Improvement
Act, and its jurisdiction was consolidated into the new Federal Circuit. Federal Courts Improvement
Act, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (1982); see also S. Corp. v. United States, 690 F.2d 1368, 1370 (Fed.
Cir. 1982) (en banc) (adopting precedent of the United States Court of Claims and United States
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals as binding).
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No authority has been cited, and none has been found to the
effect that a trademark use requires a display of a design of any par-
ticular size or prominence. The important question is not how rea-
dily the mark will be noticed but whether, when it is noticed it will
be understood as indicating origin of the goods.'94
The Trademark Office continues to acknowledge that consumer
understanding ultimately determines whether claimed matter functions
as a trademark, even though it often must rely on proxies for likely con-
sumer perception since it rarely has evidence of actual perception before
it. The Trademark Manual of Examining Procedure instructs examining
attorneys evaluating whether a particular term is a trademark eligible for
registration or merely a trade name to focus on "the manner of its use
and the probable impact of the use on customers."'95
In all of these contexts and others, a court or the Trademark Office
must determine whether a contested term performs a source identifying
function or some other function. And in all cases, the determination de-
pends in whole or in part on consumer perception of the use.'96
In fact, there are only two exceptions to the general rule that con-
sumer understanding controls the determination of protectability-the
functionality doctrine 97 and Dastar's treatment of creative content.'98
194. Chun King Corp. v. Genii Plant Line, Inc., 403 F.2d 274, 276 (C.C.P.A. 1968) (quoting In re
Singer Mfg. Co., 225 F.2d 939, 941 (C.C.P.A. 1958)) (finding "Living Earth" registrable as a trademark
because "it would be regarded as a trademark by purchasers of petitioner's goods").
195. TRADEMARK MANUAL OF EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 1202.01 (5th ed. 2007) (emphasis add-
ed).
196. For this reason, all of these determinations are regarded as questions of fact, often not easily
resolvable on summary judgment. See, e.g., Zatarains, Inc. v. Oak Grove Smokehouse, Inc., 698 F.2d
786, 793-94 (5th Cir. 1983) (noting that categorization of a term and existence of secondary meaning
are questions of fact); 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 21, § 15:29 (recognizing that secondary meaning is a
question of fact).
197. Functional product features, even ones that have source significance, are not eligible for
trademark protection. See Lanham Act §§ 2(e)(5), 14(3), 33(b)(8), 43(a)(3), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1052(e)(5),
1064(3), 1115(b)(8), 1125(a)(3) (2006). According to the Supreme Court, "a feature is also functional
when it is essential to the use or purpose of the device or when it affects the cost or quality of the de-
vice." TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 33 (2001). A feature may also be
deemed aesthetically functional, and therefore unprotectable, if exclusive use of that feature "would
put competitors at a significant non-reputation-related disadvantage." Id. at 32-33. These definitions
do rely to some extent on consumer behavior. Consumer demand presumably is relevant, for exam-
ple, to the question of whether a feature is "essential to the use or purpose of the article." Likewise,
whether exclusive use of a feature "would put competitors at a significant non-reputation-related dis-
advantage" depends on consumer demand for the feature. But neither definition depends on consum-
er understanding regarding source.
198. In Dastar. the Supreme Court dealt with the issue of reverse passing off claims in which the
"false designation of origin" by the defendant was its unattributed presentation of uncopyrighted con-
tent created by another. Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 31 (2003).
The Court narrowly construed "origin of goods" as used in section 43(a) to refer only to the origin of
the physical articles in which creative content is embodied. Id. at 37 ("[I]n light of the copyright and
patent laws (which were [designed to protect originality and creativity]), we conclude that the phrase
[origin of goods) refers to the producer of the tangible goods that are offered for sale, and not to the
author of any idea, concept, or communication embodied in those goods."). Consequently, under
Dastar, creative content embodied in books, movies, or other forms seems categorically incapable of
performing a source-indication function that courts will recognize.
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These exceptions are notable precisely because they are such departures
from the norm. Moreover, in both cases the special rules are animated
by concerns about trademark law interfering with another statutory re-
gime (patent law in the functionality context and copyright law in the
Dastar context). The determination of whether a defendant's use desig-
nates source generally does not implicate these special concerns, and
there is therefore no reason to believe that trademark use should or
could be determined on any basis other than consumer understanding.
Thus, to be specific, the issue in the trademark use cases is whether the
relevant purchasing public is likely to regard the defendant's use as one
that designates the source of the defendant's goods or services. 99
This is not to say that direct evidence of consumer understanding
will always be readily available."z° Indeed, in the absence of direct evi-
dence courts have in the past engaged the question of source indication
by focusing on circumstantial evidence such as the nature and promi-
nence of the use at issue, particularly relative to other trademarks."' But
just as in the secondary meaning context where courts seek to determine
whether a descriptive term has taken on source significance, these cir-
cumstantial clues are only proxies for consumer understanding. 2°e
199. McCarthy therefore offers no more than his assessment of the likely impact on consumers
when he concludes that a hypothetical software company does not make trademark use of "Microsoft
Windows" when it advertises that its "new [software] program will run flawlessly on MICROSOFT
WINDOWS" and that a magazine does not use "Microsoft" as a trademark when it "features on its
cover in bold letters the teaser ad 'INSIDE: NEWS ON THE LATEST MICROSOFT PRODUCT!"'
4 MCCARTHY, supra note 21, at § 23:11.50.
200. See Heartland Bank v. Heartland Home Fin., Inc., 335 F.3d 810, 820 (8th Cir. 2003) (Smith,
J., concurring) ("[I]n a trademark case, circumstantial evidence may be all that is available to establish
secondary meaning."); Burke-Parsons-Bowlby Corp. v. Appalachian Log Homes, Inc., 871 F.2d 590,
596 (6th Cir. 1989) ("Direct proof of secondary meaning is difficult to obtain.").
201. See Cosmetically Sealed Indus., Inc. v. Chesebrough-Pond's USA Co., 125 F.3d 28, 30-31 (2d
Cir. 1997) (focusing on the defendant's prominent display of its better-known trademarks and lack of
use of the contested term on packaging or promotional materials); Car-Freshner Corp. v. S.C. Johnson
& Son, Inc., 70 F.3d 267, 270 (2d Cir. 1995) (finding the defendant's use of a pine tree shape for its
pine-scented air fresheners use "otherwise than as a mark" where air fresheners came in a box promi-
nently bearing the "Glade Plug-Ins" trademark as well as the Johnson's corporate logo and each unit
had "Glade" imprinted across the front of the product itself); Zatarains, 698 F.2d at 796 (finding the
defendant's use of "fish fry" to be fair use when the defendant did not intend to use the term in a
trademark sense, had never attempted to register the words as a trademark, believed "fish fry" was a
generic name for the type of coating mix they manufactured, and consciously packaged and labeled its
products in such a way as to minimize any potential confusion in the minds of consumers); Venetia-
naire Corp. of Am. v. A & P Imp. Co., 429 F.2d 1079, 1082 (2d Cir. 1970) (focusing on typestyle and
prominence of "hygienic" to determine whether defendant's use was "otherwise than as a trade or
service mark").
202. See Heartland Bank, 335 F.3d at 820 (Smith, J., concurring) ("Various circuits and authorities
recognize that in the absence of direct proof, the court must draw reasonable inferences from the evi-
dence of money spent in advertising to establish that the mark is from a particular source, of the type
of advertising used, of long-term usage of the mark. and of sales volume." (emphasis added)); Comm.
for Idaho's High Desert, Inc. v. Yost, 92 F.3d 814, 822 (9th Cir. 1996) (calling survey evidence "one of
the most persuasive ways to prove secondary meaning" but not requiring it): Co-Rect Prods., Inc. v.
Marvy! Adver. Photography. Inc., 780 F.2d 1324,1333 n.9 (8th Cir. 1986) ("Consumer surveys are rec-
ognized by several circuits as the most direct and persuasive evidence of secondary meaning."); see
also Berner Int'l. Corp. v. Mars Sales Co., 987 F.2d 975, 982 (3d Cir. 1993) (noting that, while not re-
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The important point here is that, because trademark use can be de-
termined only from the perspective of consumers, it cannot serve as a
threshold requirement separable from the likelihood of confusion in-
quiry. A determination that the defendant's use indicates the source of
its products or services is a necessary part of every likelihood of confu-
sion finding. Moreover, in most of the types of cases trademark use ad-
vocates have identified as candidates for application of the doctrine, a
determination that the defendant's use of the plaintiff's mark indicates
source would be essentially dispositive: to reach a conclusion on trade-
mark use, the court will have to consider much of the same evidence it
will need to evaluate to make a finding on likelihood of confusion. There
is little dispute in the search engine cases, for example, that the defen-
dant is using a term that consumers recognize as the plaintiff's trade-
mark. 3 The dispute is about how the defendant is using that mark.
Consequently, as Dogan and Lemley concede, similarity of the marks is
unlikely to be contested." 4 Likewise, if consumers recognize the term
used by the defendant as the plaintiff's trademark and also believe the
defendant is using the term to indicate the source of its own goods or
services, then it is a short step to concluding the goods or services are suf-
ficiently similar and that the entities might be related in some way. In-
deed, the respective parties' goods and services are very likely to be con-
sidered in determining whether the defendant's use indicates source.
A. Courts and Commentators Are Unable to Discuss Trademark Use
Without Making Claims About Likelihood of Confusion
That trademark use cannot be determined without resort to con-
sumer understanding and therefore cannot be separated formally from
the likelihood of confusion determination is clear from courts' inability
to explain their decisions in trademark use cases without lapsing into dis-
cussions of likelihood of confusion. In Rock & Roll Hall of Fame & Mu-
seum, Inc. v. Gentile Products,5 for example, the court noted that, in or-
der to prevail, "it is clear that a plaintiff must show that it has actually
used the designation at issue as a trademark, and that the defendant has
also used the same or a similar designation as a trademark."2" But the
court further elaborated on the "trademark use" requirement: "In other
words, the plaintiff must establish a likelihood that the defendant's de-
quired, "direct consumer evidence, e.g., consumer surveys and testimony is preferable to indirect
forms of evidence").
203. One can imagine more difficult cases in which it is not clear that consumers recognize the
term used by the defendant as a trademark of the plaintiff. In such a case, consumers are unlikely to
be confused even if the defendant uses the term to indicate the source of its own products or services.
204. Dogan & Lemley, supra note 1, at 1694 ("By hypothesis, non-trademark uses often involve
the identical mark. This is because the defendant employs the mark itself either as a signal of consum-
er preferences or to refer to the trademark or something that it represents.").
205. 134 F.3d 749 (6th Cir. 1998).
206. Id. at 753.
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signation will be confused with the plaintiff's trademark, such that con-
sumers are mistakenly led to believe that the defendant's goods are pro-
duced or sponsored by the plaintiff."2" In this formulation, a "trademark
use" is simply one that is likely to be confused with the plaintiff's trade-
mark. 08
Similarly, in Interactive Products Corp. v. a2z Mobile Office Solu-
tions, Inc.,2° the court claimed that, prior to evaluating likelihood of con-
fusion, there was a preliminary question about whether the defendant's
use of the plaintiff's mark in the URL post-domain path was a use that
identified the source of their goods.2 10  "If defendants [were] only using
[the plaintiff's] trademark in a 'non-trademark' way-that is, in a way
that [did] not identify the source of a product-then trademark infringe-
ment and false designation of origin laws do not apply."2 t Yet the court
described the "ultimate issue in [the] case" as "whether a consumer [was]
likely to notice [the plaintiff's mark] in the post-domain path and then
think that the [product sold on that web page] may [have been] produced
by the same company (or a company affiliated with the company) that
[made the plaintiff's product].21 The court then resolved the case by
determining that the plaintiff had not presented any evidence that the
presence of the plaintiff's mark in the post-domain path of the defen-
dant's website was likely to cause consumer confusion regarding the
source of the website or of the products offered for sale on the website 33
Clearly, notwithstanding its initial framing, the court resolved the case,
not on a "preliminary question" of trademark use, but on the basic ques-
tion of likelihood of confusion.
A variety of false endorsement cases also depend on evaluating
source designation by reference to likely confusion. In Waits v. Frito-
Lay, Inc.,214 for example, Tom Waits objected to Frito-Lay's use of a
207. Id. at 753-55 (holding that the plaintiff had not acquired any trademark rights in a depiction
of its museum because it had not created a consistent commercial impression in its use and that the
defendant's use did not constitute trademark use because defendant's depiction of the museum was
not readily recognized as an indication of source).
208. The court aptly demonstrated the difficulty of distinguishing between trademark and non-
trademark use in its attempt to distinguish the posters at issue from a hypothetical photograph of a
Coca-Cola bottle. Id. at 754. In support of its claim, the museum had argued that the posters of the
museum were analogous to a picture of a Coke bottle, in which the subject of the picture served both
as an appealing visual image and as a designation of source. Id. The court rejected the analogy, noting
that-unlike the Coke bottle-the museum was never presented in a consistent manner such that con-
sumers might recognize it as more than a picture of an extant building. Id. At the same time, howev-
er, it recognized that the Coke bottle was a much harder case, and accepted that "a photograph which
prominently depicts another person's trademark might very well, wittingly or unwittingly, use its ob-
ject as a trademark." Id. It left open the question of how a court would determine when a prominent
depiction of another's trademark used that object as a trademark.
209. 326 F.3d 687 (6th Cir. 2003).
210. Id. at 695.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 696.
213. Id. at 698.
214. 978 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1992).
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sound-alike in its Doritos advertisement. 215  Rather than applying some
formalistic set of rules to determine what "mark" belonging to Waits Fri-
to-Lay had used, the court evaluated Waits's claim by asking whether
"ordinary consumers ... would [have been] confused as to whether Tom
Waits sang on the commercial.., and whether he sponsor[ed] or en-
dorse[d] SalsaRio Doritos." '216 It concluded that Frito-Lay was liable be-
cause it did something that suggested sponsorship or affiliation. 7 In
other words, the proof that Frito-Lay had made a source-designating use
(a "trademark use") was in the likelihood of confusion.
Similarly in Allen v. National Video, Inc.,15 the court granted sum-
mary judgment to Woody Allen on his claim that the defendant's use of a
look-alike in an advertising photograph falsely suggested Allen's en-
dorsement, in violation of section 43(a)."9 Like in Waits, the court fo-
cused on the consequences of a particular use rather than the nature of
that use. Though it believed that the pose of the look-alike was "the
classic stance of the product spokesperson," the pose seemed only addi-
tional evidence of endorsement: "When a public figure of Woody Allen's
stature appears in an advertisement, his mere presence is inescapably to
be interpreted as an endorsement.""22
What all of these cases have in common is that they approach the
question of whether the defendant's use violates the plaintiff's rights by
focusing on the effect of that use rather than trying to identify formal cri-
teria by which to categorize trademark and non-trademark uses.221
Google gets part of the way there in its brief in Rescuecom when it
concedes that visual branding is not necessary for trademark use: "When
a waitress tells you that the syrupy brown beverage in your glass is Coca-
Cola, that's trademark use. '222 Yet Google misses the import of this ex-
215. Id. at 1097-98.
216. Id. at 1111 (quoting the trial court's jury instructions).
217. Id.
218. 610 F. Supp. 612 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
219. Id. at 627 & n.8, 632. The case settled prior to trial, with National Video reportedly paying
Allen $425,000. Woody Allen Settles Lawsuit Involving Advertiser's Use of "Look Alike" Performer
for $425,000, ENT. L. REP., Oct. 1986, at 20.
220. Allen, 610 F. Supp. at 627 n.8.
221. To be sure, courts do not always believe that the complained of use really is likely to cause
confusion. In ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publishing, Inc., for example, the court refused to consider "any and
all images of Tiger Woods" a trademark of Woods, holding that "[no reasonable person could believe
that merely because these photographs or paintings contain Woods's likeness or image, they all origi-
nated with Woods." 332 F.3d 915, 922 (6th Cir. 2003). Likewise, the court in Kournikova v. General
Media Communications Inc., rejected tennis player Anna Koumikova's false endorsement claim
against Penthouse magazine, which had published photos of a topless sunbather who the magazine
falsely identified as Kournikova. No. CV 02-3747, 2002 WL 31628027 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 2, 2002). It re-
jected Kournikova's claim because it found that no reasonable reader would believe that Kournikova
endorsed the magazine when the story, the cover headline ("CAUGHT UP CLOSE ON NUDE
BEACH"), and context made it clear that the neither plaintiff nor the person in the photos voluntarily
posed for the magazine. Id. at *1620. But the important point here is that, even when courts reject a
claim, they do so because they believe the use does not suggest endorsement, evaluated from the pers-
pective of consumers.
222. Google Brief, supra note 2, at 11-12.
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ample when it continues to insist that a party must present the mark to
customers in order to infringe.223
Imagine a slight variation on Google's example in which a customer
asks a waitress to bring her a Coca-Cola. The waitress says nothing and
returns with a syrupy brown beverage that, quite reasonably, the custom-
er believes to be Coca-Cola. Clearly the waitress in this example has in-
dicated to the customer that Coca-Cola is the source of the syrupy brown
beverage, but she has done this without ever "presenting" the mark to
the customer.224 Indeed, in the words of the Second Circuit, the wai-
tress's utilization of the Coca-Cola trademark was entirely "internal.
225
As this example demonstrates, a party can indicate source in many
ways, sometimes without ever presenting the mark to consumers. A par-
ty must of course do something to cause consumers to believe it has des-
ignated the source of its products or services. But courts should not be
too rigid when identifying what the defendant has done to indicate
source. Instead, courts should focus on whether the defendant has indi-
cated source and simply ask whether consumers understand the use-
whatever it is-to indicate source.
B. Trademark Use in the Search Engine Context
When applying these lessons to the search engine cases, it is clear
that courts thus far generally have framed the trademark use question
incorrectly.
There are two contexts in which a search engine might be thought
to make "trademark use" of a party's marks when it sells keywords to
advertisers. The first context involves the search engine and the adver-
tisers who purchase the right to have their advertisements triggered in
response to certain keywords. In this context, the question is whether
the advertisers-the relevant purchasing public-view the keywords they
purchase as indications of the source of the search engine's services.
More specifically in the context of the Rescuecom case, the question is
whether the parties who purchase the right to have their ads triggered in
response to "Rescuecom" are likely to believe that Google's use of
"Rescuecom" as a keyword suggests that Rescuecom sponsored or is affi-
liated with Google's services. Admittedly, this type of confusion seems
unlikely, and it may well be that plaintiffs in these cases do not even se-
riously allege as much. But the question cannot be resolved without fo-
cusing on the understanding of the keyword purchasers.
223. Id. at 23.
224. Cf. Coca-Cola Co. v. Old Country Rd. Diner, Inc., 1971 WL 16669, at *219-20 (E.D.N.Y.
Dec. 22, 1971) (finding a violation of a previously entered consent judgment when the "plaintiff's trade
examiners made visits to the place of business of the defendant and placed orders for 'Coca-Cola', or
'Coke', and in thirty-four (34) instances were served a product not 'Coca-Cola'; and without explana-
tion").
225. 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenUcom, Inc., 414 F.3d 400,409 (2d Cir. 2005).
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The second context in which a search engine might be thought to
make trademark use of a keyword is in generating search results. Here,
contrary to the Second Circuit's opinion in 1-800 Contacts, the issue is
not whether the search engine makes the mark visible to consumers.2 6
Rather, the relevant question is whether consumers understand the
search engine, in generating its search results, to be using the keyword in
a way that signifies some type of source relationship between the search
engine and the owner of the trademarked keyword.227 If consumers do
not understand Google to be using the Rescuecom mark at all, or to be
using it in a way that designates source, then Google has not made in-
fringing trademark use. If, on the other hand, consumers understand
Google's use of the term to indicate the source of Google's search servic-
es, it has made "trademark use."
Precision is important here. It would not be sufficient for direct in-
fringement for Rescuecom to prove that Google's use of Rescuecom in-
dicated to consumers that Rescuecom was the source of the products or
services sold by the advertisers whose ads are generated by the search.
Rather, it must be clear that consumers regard the search results as an
indication that Rescuecom is the source of Google's search services.2" If it
is true, as Google claims in its brief to the Second Circuit, that Rescu-
ecom's allegations of confusion are limited to the claim that "'at least
some consumers.., are deceived into believing such Sponsored Links
226. See id. ("A company's internal utilization of a trademark in a way that does not communicate
it to the public is analogous to a [sic] individual's private thoughts about a trademark. Such conduct
simply does not violate the Lanham Act, which is concerned with the use of trademarks in connection
with the sale of goods or services in a manner likely to lead to consumer confusion as to the source of
such goods or services.").
227. The Second Circuit is therefore wrong to focus on whether the trademark is communicated
to the public as opposed to utilized internally. See id. The issue is consumer understanding, not com-
munication by the defendant. Communication may be a proxy for consumer understanding in some
cases, but it is only a proxy.
228. Section 43(a) makes clear this requirement that the defendant's use indicate the source of its
own goods or services. Lanham Act § 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A) (2006) ("Any person who...
uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof, or any false
designation of origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false or misleading representation of
fact, which ... is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation, con-
nection, or association of such person with another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval
of his or her goods, services, or commercial activities by another person .... " (emphasis added)). Op-
ponents of the trademark use doctrine have sometimes ignored the fact that the statute requires this
specific type of confusion and have argued about the search engine cases by pointing to broader confu-
sion search engines might generate. See, e.g., Dinwoodie & Janis, supra note 5, at 1635-36 (arguing
that the trademark use doctrine prevents trademark law from sufficiently regulating the presentation
of search results, particularly with respect to differentiation of paid and unpaid search results); Glynn
S. Lunney, Jr., Trademarks and the Internet: The United States' Experience, 97 TRADEMARK REP. 931,
937 (2007) (arguing that the Second Circuit's treatment of keyword advertising cases through the
trademark use doctrine "may vindicate the conduct of a particular defendant, but in addition to other
difficulties, is poorly tailored to protecting the relevant consumer interests at stake. Some keyword-
triggered ads can materially confuse consumers, leading them to buy from company A believing they
are buying from company B, while other triggered ads do not ...."). These commentators' concerns
about more generalized confusion caused by search engines, of course, merit serious consideration.
But the type of confusion they describe falls outside the reach of trademark law regardless of the
trademark use doctrine.
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are related to Rescuecom,' and that consumers 'may become confused,
mistaken, misled and/or deceived that Sponsored Links which link to
Rescuecom Corporation's competitor's websites may be affiliated with,
connected to, or approved by' Rescuecom," then Rescuecom's allega-
tions would be insufficient on this score.229
V. THE PROBLEM OF SOURCE IN TRADEMARK LAW
As the trademark use advocates legitimately fear, the trademark
use determination is highly contextual and ill-suited to early resolution
because it depends on consumer understanding. The consumer focus al-
so means the trademark use determination is likely to be fairly unpre-
dictable from an ex ante position.
But while the concept of trademark use is not capable of delineating
clearly the scope of trademark rights, trademark law's tendency towards
ever broader rights cannot be attributed to the lack of a threshold trade-
mark use doctrine. Instead, what the trademark use debate demon-
strates is the fundamental inadequacy of modern trademark theory.
Unlike traditional trademark law, which regarded consumer confu-
sion only as evidence of potential illegitimacy,23° modem trademark law,
deeply influenced by the search costs rationale, regards consumer confu-
sion as a problem in and of itself. Not surprisingly, consumer under-
standing therefore pervades trademark law.
By itself, this heavy focus on consumer understanding renders
trademark law inherently unstable. Consumers' expectations naturally
evolve as they become more familiar with new commercial contexts or
relationships. And consumers do not develop their expectations in a va-
cuum. Instead consumers are bombarded with marketing information
229. Google Brief, supra note 2, at 12 (citations omitted). This type of confusion might conceiva-
bly be the basis of secondary liability for Google, though the tests for secondary trademark liability are
stringent. See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Int'l Serv., Ass'n, 494 F.3d 788, 806 (9th Cir. 2007) ("The tests for
secondary trademark infringement are even more difficult to satisfy than those required to find sec-
ondary copyright infringement."). "To be liable for contributory trademark infringement, a defendant
must have (1) 'intentionally induced' the primary infringer to infringe, or (2) continued to supply an
infringing product to an infringer with knowledge that the infringer is mislabeling the particular prod-
uct supplied." Id. at 807 (quoting Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 855 (1982)).
When the alleged direct infringer supplies a service rather than a product, under the second prong of
this test, the court must "consider the extent of control exercised by the defendant over the third par-
ty's means of infringement." Id. at 807 (quoting Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc.,
194 F.3d 980, 984 (9th Cir. 1999)). For liability to attach, there must be "[d]irect control and monitor-
ing of the instrumentality used by a third party to infringe the plaintiff's mark." Lockheed Martin, 194
F.3d at 984. Vicarious liability for trademark infringement requires "a finding that the defendant and
the infringer have an apparent or actual partnership, have authority to bind one another in transac-
tions with third parties or exercise joint ownership or control over the infringing product." Perfect 10,
494 F.3d at 807 (quoting Hard Rock Cafe Licensing Corp. v. Concession Servs., Inc., 955 F.2d 1143,
1150 (7th Cir. 1992)).
230. McKenna, supra note 4, at 1866-71 (noting that courts traditionally tolerated substantial con-
fusion in situations in which the defendant could not be characterized as illegitimately seeking to di-
vert sales from a competitor).
No. 31
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW
designed to shape their understanding of commercial relationships, and
there is substantial evidence of its success. Moreover, legal doctrine and
consumer expectations feed off each other, creating an endless loop:
what consumers know (or think they know) about the law shapes expec-
tations, which then feed back into the law only to influence future expec-
tations.231 This type of doctrinal feedback is not, of course, unique to
trademark law.232 Yet, dependence on consumer understanding creates
particular instability in trademark law because courts are required to in-
stantiate consumer understanding of "source" relationships.
In some sense this has always been true: trademark law has always
depended on consumer understanding of source. But this focus creates
much greater instability now than it used to because source is now de-
fined much more broadly. When they were concerned only with trade
diversion, courts defined source narrowly as the actual, historical source
of a product.233 This allowed courts to differentiate between relevant and
irrelevant forms of confusion and easily rule out liability for things like
editorial uses. There was little risk that consumers looking for an auto-
mobile would be diverted to a newspaper because they saw Ford Motor
Company in the title of a newspaper article.
By contrast, "source" in modern trademark law is an extraordinarily
broad concept capable of encompassing virtually any relationship be-
tween entities. In particular, courts must determine whether a relatively
small proportion of consumers2 4 are likely to believe the trademark
231. Cf. Gibson, supra note 4.
232. See, e.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1034 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(noting the circularity in the context of government takings: "if the owner's reasonable expectations
are shaped by what courts allow as a proper exercise of governmental authority, property tends to be-
come what courts say it is"); United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 786 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting)
(noting, in the context of the Fourth Amendment's protection of our reasonable expectations of priva-
cy, that "[o]ur expectations, and the risks we assume, are in large part reflections of laws that translate
into rules the customs and values of the past and present"); Gibson, supra note 4, at 951 n.262; Sara K.
Stadler, Incentive and Expectation in Copyright, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 433, 454 (2007) (noting in copyright
law that "[w]hen Congress acts to provide creators with the rewards they expect ... the result is a cir-
cularity of expectation that leads ... to an increase in exclusivity").
233. See McKenna, supra note 4, at 1866.
234. Courts generally articulate the relevant standard as a question of whether the defendant's
use is likely to cause confusion among "an appreciable number of ordinarily prudent purchasers."
McGregor-Doniger Inc. v. Drizzle Inc., 599 F.2d 1126, 1130 (2d Cir. 1979) ("[A]n appreciable number
of ordinarily prudent purchasers are likely to be misled, or indeed simply confused, as to the source of
the goods...." (quoting Mushroom Makers, Inc. v. R.G. Barry Corp., 580 F.2d 44, 47 (2d Cir. 1978),
cert denied, 439 U.S. 1116 (1979))); see also Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO
v. Winship Green Nursing Ctr., 103 F.3d 196, 201 (1st Cir. 1996) ("The law has long demanded a show-
ing that the allegedly infringing conduct carries with it a likelihood of confounding an appreciable
number of reasonably prudent purchasers exercising ordinary care."). While there is no absolute
quantitative threshold for determining what level of confusion is "appreciable," courts have generally
been persuaded by evidence of 15 percent confusion. See, e.g., Exxon Corp. v. Tex. Motor Exch. of
Houston, Inc., 628 F.2d 500, 507 (5th Cir. 1980) (finding a 15 percent level of confusion was strong evi-
dence of likelihood of confusion); RJR Foods, Inc. v. White Rock Corp., 603 F.2d 1058, 1061 (2d Cir.
1979) (finding a 15 to 20 percent level of confusion corroborates likelihood of confusion); James Bur-
rough Ltd. v. Sign of the Beefeater, Inc., 540 F.2d 266, 279 (7th Cir. 1976) (finding a 15 percent level of
confusion was neither small nor de minimis). In one case, the court called evidence of 8.5 percent con-
[Vol. 2009
TRADEMARK USE AND THE PROBLEM OF SOURCE
owner "sponsored" or was "affiliated with" the defendant's products or
services. Moreover, trademark law condemns confusion about sponsor-
ship or affiliation without precisely defining those terms or attempting to
determine whether, or in what circumstances, consumers care about such
relationships.
And the modern marketplace abounds with licensing arrangements
unimaginable in the traditional trademark era. American Idol judges
Simon Cowell, Paula Abdul, Randy Jackson, and Kara DioGuardi spend
each episode behind prominently placed Coca-Cola cups.235 As part of a
relationship between General Motors and the producers of the recently
released Transformers movie, four GM vehicles have starring roles in the
film: the Chevrolet Camero, the Hummer H2, the GMC Topkick pick-up
truck, and the Pontiac Solstice convertible. 236  Even start times are for
sale: because of a promotional arrangement with 7-Eleven, the Chicago
White Sox have begun every home game since the beginning of the 2007
season at 7:11 p.m.
23 7
Not surprisingly, in this legal and marketing context courts are find-
ing it increasingly difficult to rule out source signification in virtually any
context. When product placement is commonplace, can consumers ever
be sure that the presence of a branded product in a creative work does
not reflect a licensing relationship? If the start time of a baseball game
indicates 7-Eleven's sponsorship, is it really possible to say definitively
that consumers would conclude that the presence of "Microsoft" in the
title of an article does not?
The seriousness of these questions ought to give pause to anyone
who believes trademark law does-or should-protect only limited
rights. The fact is that courts can plausibly find likely confusion regard-
ing sponsorship or affiliation based on almost any use of another's mark.
"Sponsorship" and "affiliation" are broad enough concepts to encompass
virtually any imaginable relationship between entities, and almost all of
those imaginable relationships exist in the modern marketplace. And
fusion "strong evidence" of a likelihood of confusion. Grotrian, Helfferich, Schulz, Th. Steinweg
Nachf. v. Steinway & Sons, 365 F. Supp. 707, 716 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), modified on other grounds, 523 F.2d
1331 (2d Cir. 1975).
235. For American Idol, this is only the beginning of the product placement. See Katherine Neer,
How Product Placement Works, How STUFF WORKS, http://money.howstuffworks.com/product-
placement6.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 2009) (noting other product placement strategies on the show,
such as having the contestants wait in the Coca-Cola room during elimination episodes). American
Idol is hardly alone in this practice. See ROB WALKER, BUYING IN: THE SECRET DIALOGUE
BETWEEN WHAT WE BUY AND WHO WE ARE 129 (2008) (reporting that, in 2006, six minutes and
twenty-two seconds of a typical prime-time television show were devoted to paid product placements
and that, in the third quarter of 2006 alone, episodes of Rockstar: Supernova included 1,609 product or
brand image shots).
236. See OJ Fagbire, Transformer Movie Incorporates the Strongest Product Placement in Film
History, PRODUCT PLACEMENT NEWS, July 16, 2007, http://www.productplacement.biz/200707172268/
news/product-placement/transformer-movie-incorporates-the-strongest-prduct-pacement-in-film-
history.html.
237. See Richard Sandomir, White Sox Have New Start Time: 7-Eleven, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2006,
http:l/www.nytimes.com/2006/10l1 1/sports/baseball/llsox.html.
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because modern trademark law regards confusion itself as the relevant
harm, it has no principled way to distinguish confusion regarding differ-
ent relationships. To put it more concretely, the search costs theory, in
its present form, is theoretically and practically incapable of providing a
normative basis for limiting the scope of trademark rights.
238
Finding a way out of this perpetual cycle will require fundamental
rethinking of the purposes of trademark law. Only when we develop a
richer theoretical basis for protecting source indicators and a better un-
derstanding of the alleged harms suffered by consumers and producers
when consumers are confused can we develop methods for systematically
distinguishing between relevant and irrelevant confusion. This is the
challenge for all who seek meaningful limits on trademark rights, and it
will require much more sustained analysis than this Article can provide.
There are, however, some potential methods of limiting the scope of
trademark rights worth mentioning here, if only to frame some possibili-
ties for further elaboration. These possibilities are the subject of the re-
maining Sections of this Article.
A. Divorcing the Scope of Rights from Consumer Expectations
The most obvious way to curb expansion of trademark rights is to
recognize additional doctrines, like functionality, that are outcome de-
terminative without regard to consumer understanding.239 Some existing
defenses could be made independent simply by ceasing to condition the
defenses on lack of confusion. Courts could determine, for example, that
comparative advertising has social benefit and is not infringement even if
it causes some confusion. Likewise, Congress could amend sec-
tion 33(b)(4) to remove the requirement that the use be "otherwise than
as a mark," thereby making any descriptive use of a mark a fair use, even
if consumers might also regard the use as source designating.
238. Mark owners generally have understood this, and they have been able to achieve their cur-
rent level of control by arguing within trademark doctrine, using the language and logic of the search
costs theory. See McKenna, supra note 4, at 1916 ("Producers are able to frame just about any argu-
ment for broader protection in terms of consumer expectations, which they are in position to influence
systematically through marketing.").
239. Functionality does depend to some extent, of course, on consumer expectations in the mar-
ketplace. In assessing mechanical functionality, a court must determine whether a feature is "essential
to the use or purpose of the article or affects the cost or quality of the article." TrafFix Devices, Inc. v.
Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 32 (2001) (quoting Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S.
159, 165 (1995)). One could imagine fairly objective criteria on which to evaluate cost, but whether a
feature is essential to the use or purpose of an article depends, at least to some extent, on how con-
sumers expect to use the article. The focus on consumers is perhaps more significant in the context of
aesthetic functionality since a feature is deemed aesthetically functional if its "exclusive use.., would
put competitors at a significant non-reputation-related disadvantage." Id. (quoting Qualitex, 514 U.S.
at 165). Whether parties need to use certain features to compete effectively in a given market depends
to a substantial degree on how one defines the relevant market. Assuming that is done by focusing on
the substitutability of different products, consumers ultimately define the relevant markets.
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These changes would be only a partial remedy, however, because
some determinations inherent in these defenses cannot be completely se-
vered from consumer perception. In the comparative advertising con-
text, for example, even if they are not required to consider confusion,
courts will have to determine whether a challenged use is in fact compar-
ative. The answer in some cases may be clear, but it seems likely that
courts will evaluate comparativeness from a consumer perspective-
asking whether consumers are likely to perceive the use as comparative.
Similarly, even if the statutory fair use provision was amended to allow
descriptive uses to be deemed fair even if they also indicate source,
courts would still have to determine that the challenged use was a de-
scriptive one.2" This inquiry also can be resolved only from a consumer
perspective. In neither of these contexts, however, would the relevant
consumer perception relate to "source," nor would courts have to deter-
mine whether consumers were confused.
B. Redefining Source to Limit Trademark Rights
Another, potentially more controversial, way to limit the scope of
trademark rights would be to redefine source more narrowly so that con-
sumer confusion would have to relate to a more limited set of possible
relationships. This solution is based on the intuition that not all types of
confusion are equally harmful: some confusion affects consumers' pur-
chasing decisions, and some does not. Starting from the assumption that
consumer confusion is harmful only to the extent that it affects purchas-
ing decisions, courts could differentiate between relevant and irrelevant
confusion on a case-by-case basis by requiring the plaintiff to prove that
the defendant's use is likely to cause confusion that will materially affect
consumer purchasing decisions.
A judicially created materiality requirement is not inconsistent with
anything in the Lanham Act, nor would it be unprecedented in this area.
Courts developed and continue to implement a materiality requirement
in false advertising cases under section 43(a)(1)(B) of the Lanham Act. 41
Under that provision, "any person who believes that he or she is or is
likely to be damaged" has a cause of action against
[a]ny person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or
any container for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name,
symbol, or device, or any combination thereof, or any false designa-
tion of origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false or mis-
leading representation of fact, which (B) in commercial advertising
or promotion, misrepresents the nature, characteristics, qualities, or
240. See 6 MCCARTHY, supra note 21, § 11:45.
241. Lanham Act § 43(a)(1)(B), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(B) (2006).
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geographic origin of his or her or another person's goods, services,
or commercial activities, shall be liable in a civil action.242
Interpreting this language, courts have long required that the "false
or misleading description of fact, or false or misleading representation of
fact" be material in the sense that it would affect consumers' purchasing
decisions.243 In National Basketball Ass'n v. Motorola, Inc.,24 for exam-
ple, the court addressed the NBA's false advertising claim based on a
press release from Motorola "stating that SportsTrax provides 'updated
game information direct from each arena' which 'originate[s] from the
press table in each arena' and on a statement appearing on the spine of
the retail box and on the retail display stand that SportsTrax provides
'game updates from the arena."'245 The court concluded that, while the
statements were false because Motorola collected its information from
television and radio broadcasts, they were not actionable: "The inaccura-
cy in the statements would not influence consumers at the present time,
whose interest in obtaining updated game scores on pagers is served only
by SportsTrax.
246
Applied in the context of trademark infringement, courts could re-
quire that, as a result of the defendant's use, not only were consumers
likely to be confused regarding the source of the defendant's products or
services, but that consumers' confusion would materially affect their pur-
chasing decisions. Imposing such a materiality requirement would, in
some cases, eliminate liability altogether. In other cases, focusing on ma-
teriality might affect the nature of the remedies afforded to the mark
242. Id.
243. The Fifth Circuit has held that materiality can be presumed when the challenged statement is
literally false. Pizza Hut, Inc. v. Papa John's Int'l, Inc., 227 F.3d 489, 497 (5th Cir. 2000). Though it
cited some cases from other circuits for this proposition, those cases do not clearly support the Fifth
Circuit's position. Castrol, Inc. v. Quaker State Corp., for example, imposes a "different burden in
proving literally false the advertised claim that tests prove defendant's product superior, than it does in
proving the falsity of a superiority claim which makes no mention of tests." 977 F.2d 57, 62 (2d Cir.
1992). But that decision does not deal with any distinction between literally false statements and liter-
ally true but misleading statements. The only other circuit that has explicitly addressed the question is
the Eleventh Circuit, and it has expressly held that materiality must be proven in all cases, even where
the defendant's statement is literally false. Johnson & Johnson Vision Care, Inc. v. 1-800 Contacts,
Inc., 299 F.3d 1242, 1250-51 (11th Cir. 2002) ("To the extent that the Fifth Circuit decision marks a
circuit split, we stand with the First and Second Circuits, concluding that the plaintiff must establish
materiality even when a defendant's advertisement has been found literally false."). In my view, the
Eleventh Circuit's approach is sound. As that court noted, regardless of the reason any particular
statement deceives consumers, "not all deceptions affect consumer decisions." Id. at 1250.
244. 105 F.3d 841 (2d Cir. 1997).
245. Id. at 855.
246. Id.; see also Pizza Hut, 227 F.3d at 503-04 (finding Papa John's advertising slogan "Better
Ingredients. Better Pizza" misleading in the context of the advertisements at issue, but that there was
"no evidence demonstrating that the slogan had the tendency to deceive consumers so as to affect
their purchasing decisions"). Some courts have allowed that statements relating to "inherent qua-
lit[iesl or characteristic[s]" of products are presumed material. See, e.g., Cashmere & Camel Hair
Mfrs. Inst. v. Saks Fifth Ave., 284 F.3d 302, 311-13 (1st Cir. 2002) (finding the statement that women's
blazers were a blend of wool and cashmere material as to the content of the product because it related
to an "inherent quality or characteristic" of the product, requiring only that defendant's misrepresen-
tation was likely to influence consumers' purchasing decisions).
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owner. If, for example, it appears in a particular case that consumers'
purchasing decisions are affected by confusion about actual source, but
not by confusion regarding a potential licensing relationship, then courts
could adequately prevent material confusion without enjoining the de-
fendant's use altogether-perhaps simply by requiring clear labeling of
the actual source.
If we could determine with greater confidence that certain types of
relationships between parties tend to be material to consumers while
others do not, this distinction could be made more categorically. Specifi-
cally, courts could simply define relevant "source" confusion as confu-
sion relating to those particular types of relationships that tend to be ma-
terial to consumers. Courts could, for example, reject the idea that
source must mean the same thing in the infringement context as it does
in the context of creating and maintaining rights and require infringe-
ment plaintiffs to prove consumer confusion about actual source rather
than "sponsorship" or "affiliation."
In this dichotomous system, IBM would have legitimate rights in its
mark even if it outsourced production of its computers, as long as it exer-
cised quality control over the actual producers. When it attempted to en-
force its rights against another party, however, IBM would have to show
that consumers actually believed that IBM manufactured the other par-
ty's goods.247
There are risks to limiting trademark rights in this way, and I do not
suggest that I have fully considered every issue with this approach here.
First, this model depends to a large extent on an assumption that con-
sumers do not understand the business arrangements of most trademark
owners. In the IBM example above, it assumes that consumers do not
know, and probably do not care, what entity actually produces IBM
computers. But this assumption may not always be justified. Consumers
may in some cases understand a mark owner's business arrangements
well enough that dichotomous treatment of "source" would limit trade-
mark rights too much. Take a well-known franchising situation, for ex-
ample. If consumers understand that virtually all McDonald's restau-
rants are individually owned and that the McDonald's Corporation is not
the actual source of the food served in any given restaurant, they are not
likely to believe that McDonald's Corporation is the actual source of
food at an unauthorized McDonald's restaurant. But because this disbe-
lief that the McDonald's Corporation is the source of the food would not
differentiate the unauthorized restaurant from the authorized ones, these
consumers may well still expect to be able to order a Big Mac at the un-
authorized McDonald's.
247. Because source is defined differently here, we would not be concerned that consumers
wrongly attributed production of the genuine IBM computers to IBM.
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Second, this approach may in some cases run contrary to consumer
expectations and increase search costs. It may be that, at least in some
cases, consumers do care about more than the actual source of a product
or service such that other types of relationships ("sponsorship" or "affili-
ation" relationships) affect those consumers' purchasing decisions. For
those who regard search costs as a significant consideration in trademark
law, this should be regarded as a serious concern. This problem could be
mitigated, however, by combining a narrower definition of source with a
type of materiality test. Under such an approach, confusion about any-
thing other than actual source would be presumptively irrelevant, unless
the mark owner could show that consumer confusion about some other
type of relationship was material to the relevant consumers' purchasing
decisions.
VI. CONCLUSION
Trademark law is in desperate need of a reliable limiting principle.
Unfortunately, trademark use is not capable of filling that role. Al-
though the Lanham Act does condition liability on a defendant making a
source-indicating use of the plaintiff's mark, source indication, like vir-
tually everything else in trademark law, can be determined only from the
perspective of consumers. In fact, it is precisely this reliance on consum-
er understanding, and not courts' failure to apply a robust trademark use
doctrine, that is responsible for trademark law's perpetual expansion.
Only by divorcing the scope of trademark rights from consumer under-
standing in at least some circumstances and defining relevant source rela-
tionships with much greater specificity can courts create boundaries with
any stability. Determining when to deviate from consumer understand-
ing, however, will require a much richer theoretical account of the pur-
poses of trademark protection than currently prevails. In this respect,
the trademark use debate is not an isolated one, but a window to a more
fundamental conceptual problem.
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